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Abstract
This paper takes an in-depth look at the current state of the local public finances
in the Latin America region, identifies and analyzes some of the main challenges for
improving efficiency, equity and effectiveness in the delivery of public services and it
closes by offering a set of recommendations for policy reform
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workshop in San Salvador in Ferbruary 2010 for helpful comments on previous drafts.

2

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

Local governance and the municipality have a long history and tradition in Latin
America going back to colonial times.2 But it has been only after the 1980s, and for many
countries only in the last decade, that genuine decentralization reform efforts have come
to invigorate and enhance the role of local governments. However, despite some
significant progress to date many challenges still remain for municipalities to play a
vibrant and meaningful role in the delivery of public services and to contribute to
improve the daily lives of Latin American citizens.3
The general trend has been an increasing level of fiscal decentralization in the
Latin American region over the last two decades when we measure fiscal decentralization
as sub-national expenditures as percent of national expenditures (from on average 13
percent in 1985 to 19 percent in 2005), or as sub-national revenues and expenditures as
percent of GDP (from 5.5 percent in 2000 to 6.6 percent in 2007). However, there are
significant variations in these trends across countries in the region.4 Overall, increased
decentralization can be detected in the devolution of new responsibilities including the
environment and the fight against poverty and in the increase in decentralized
expenditures in education, health, etc. Less progress can be detected in the devolution of
autonomous revenue sources.
Fiscal decentralization continues to be a dynamic process in Latin America.
Recent times have seen a variety of innovations in the region that have attracted interest
from all corners of the world, for example raking systems local performance in Brazil and
Colombia, per client based transfers for health and education in Chile, or fighting poverty
with direct transfers to families administered by municipalities in Brazil. A good number
of countries are embarked or considering significant reforms that that will further deepen
and strengthen municipal autonomy. For example, Bolivia has recently approved a new
Constitution to allow for better representation at the sub-national level of different ethnic
groups; Uruguay recently has introduced a third tier of government with 89 new
2

See United Cities and Local Governments 2008 GOLD I report.
The effectiveness of decentralization efforts has varied considerably across countries of the Latin America
region. In the last decade, decentralization has moved at a fast pace in countries such as Colombia and Peru
but it continues to be stagnant after several decades of planning and legal measures in countries such as the
Dominican Republic and Haiti. Besides Brazil and all the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America,
this paper covers also Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As shorthand, all the countries will be
addressed in this paper as Latin America.
4
See, for example, Daughters and Harper (2007).
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municipalities; Costa Rica has approved also very recently the ―Ley General de
Transferencia de Competencias y Recursos a los Municipios‖ which provides the
possibility to transfer 10 percent of the national budget resources to the municipalities
clearing the way for these local government to assume new competencies and improve
the quality of services and infrastructure; or in El Salvador the association of
municipalities (COMURES) is maintaining an active dialog with the central authorities to
increase the funding and general stability of the general transfer system. On the other
hand, there are countries in the region where some trends have been in the opposite
direction and could go toward some forms of re-centralization. For example, in Argentina
the Law of Economic Emergency of 2002 and the Budget Law of 2006 have given
central authorities increased discretion to assign federal funds or unilaterally interrupt
their disbursement. In the Dominican Republic there have also been elements of
recentralization with new Municipal Law of 2007 establishing fixed budget shares for
different types of expenditures on personnel, services, public infrastructure, etc ; it is also
feared that the new country constitution will lead to the general transfer fund of 10
percent of the state budget.

Similarly, in Peru recent legislation has revoked the

municipalities‘ prerogative to issue building licenses and rezoning of land use and the
regular transfer funds allocated to municipalities have been significantly reduced for
2009 to 2011. In Colombia, the central government has recently decided to directly
allocate resources for water and sanitation that until then had been assigned to municipal
governments (through a fiduciary fund administrated by Central Government). Finally, in
Venezuela the municipal authorities have been denouncing the continuous curtailment of
competencies and resources and the increasing encroachment of the central authorities in
local matters.
This paper takes an in-depth look at the current state of the local public finances
in the Latin America region, identifies and analyzes some of the main challenges for
improving efficiency, equity and effectiveness in the delivery of public services and for
promoting development and it closes by offering a set of recommendations for policy
reform.5

5

The focus of this report is on fiscal decentralization. Issues of political and administrative decentralization
for the most part are not covered in the report.
3
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I. Overview of the Structure and Performance of Local Government
Finances in the Region
Countries in the region are highly diverse along a number of dimensions: federal
versus unitary, size, colonial tradition, etc.. This diversity is found first among the four
federal countries in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Among the
countries with a unitary system we can identify clusters of countries with more similar
institutions and current challenges, including the Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru and Bolivia), the generally smaller countries of Central America, the Island States
with non-Iberian traditions,6 and what we could call the southern cone exceptions
(Paraguay, Uruguay and especially Chile) because of their approach to fiscal
decentralization. The diversity is also found in population size (from the 196 million of
Brazil to the one million of Trinidad and Tobago), in real GDP per capita (from $9,357 in
Argentina in 2007 in constant 2000 US dollars to $884 in Nicaragua and only $411 in
Haiti), and in other dimensions.
However, there are also many common features in the way that municipalities are
structured and work, which enables us to treat all municipal governments in the region
from a common perspective. An important common feature is that, for those countries
with more than one tier of sub-national government, the relationship between the central
government and the municipalities are for the most part directly between these two levels
as opposed to the central government dealing exclusively with the regional and local
governments and then these latter dealing exclusively with the municipalities.7 In most
cases, the legal status of the municipalities clearly stated in the constitution or specialized
laws, such as municipal codes. The most important exception to this rule is Argentina
where the constitution gives the intermediate level government, the provinces, discretion
to structure the fiscal arrangements with the municipalities.8 To a lesser extent the same
6

Naturally, these countries are not usually classified as ―Latin‖ America.
In the technical parlance the vertical relationships between different levels of government are bifurcated
(central to local and central to regional, separately) as opposed to hierarchical (central to regional to local,
all linked)..
8
In contrast, for example, the Brazilian Constitution defines its political system as the union of the central
government, the states, and the municipalities, thus giving local governments an autonomous standing visà-vis the intermediate level governments.
7
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story is repeated in Mexico.9 Thus, the key difference explaining the different approaches
to central-local relations is that between ‗federal‘ and ‗unitary‘ nations. But even in the
federal cases, despite the variety of provincial-local arrangements that exist in Argentina
and to a lesser extent in Mexico, 10 the issues currently facing municipal governments are
not essentially different from those being faced by the rest of the municipalities in the
region. For this reason, in this the report we will not make a point of identifying the
different groups of country experiences but instead we will use a common framework for
all countries, identifying throughout particular country experiences as lessons of what
needs to be avoided or what may be desirable to imitate and replicate.
The Structure of Local Governments
As a rule the vertical structure of government in Latin America is organized in
three tiers of government (Table1), with the exceptions of Peru, that has four levels, and
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago that have two levels11 The focus of this paper will be
almost exclusively on the lowest tier of government: the municipalities. The intermediate
levels (States, provinces, regions and departments) will be referred to only in issues
relevant to the municipalities.

9

Brazilian states also have some limited role in managing the municipalities.
Note also that the status of the capital city of Buenos Aires is defined separately in the Constitution.

10

11

In the case of Bolivia, the provincial level may not be interpreted as an additional autonomous level.
5
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Table 1: Decentralization in Latin America: Political and Territorial Organization
(2007)

Country

Levels
of gov.
(#)

Argentina

3

Bolivia

4

Brazil
Chile

3
3

Colombia

3

Costa Rica
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador

3
3

El Salvador

3

Guatemala

3

Haiti

3

Honduras

3

Jamaica
Mexico

2
3

Nicaragua

3

Panama

3

Paraguay

3

Peru

3

Trinidad and
Tobago
Uruguay

2

Venezuela

3

3

2

Govt. level names

federal, provincial,
municipality/department
national, department,
municipality/canton
federal, state, municipal
national, region,
municipality
national, department,
municipality
national, canton
national, province,
municipality
national, province,
canton
national, department,
municipality
national, department,
municipality
national, department,
commune
national, department,
municipality
national, parish
national, state,
municipality
national, department,
municipality (+ 2 special
regions)
national,
province/comarca,
district
national, department,
canton
national, region/special
province,
province/district
national,
region/borough/city
national, department
(municipality)
national, state,
municipality

Interm
ediate
Level
(level
2)

Local
level
(Level
3)

Level
4

Average
Population
Level 2

Average
Populati
on Level
3

Populatio
n in the
largest
city
(% of
urban
populatio
n)

1,686,750

24,714

35

Populat
ion in
urban
agglome
rations
>1
million
(% of
total
populat
ion)
39

1,027,535

28,280*

26

32

1379

GDP
per
capita
(curren
t US$)

24

1638

9

327

27
(15)

5564
345

7,271,948
1,096,943

35,288
47,555*

12
39

38
34

6855
9878

32

1102

1,422,401

39,927

25

28.8

4724

(7)
(32)

81
229

599,416
297,098

51,801
61,237

..
32

35
22

10800
3772

22

215

633,075

64,780

29

32

3335

(14)

262

504,743

26,971

35

21

2973

(22)

333

591,009

39,046

16

8

2536

10

140

892,455

----

46

21

699

(18)

298

424,407

25,635

..

..

1722

14
2454

200,309
3,436,106

44,807

..
10

..

32

4272
14400

(17)

153

340,344

37,816

..

..

1022

14

75

236,406

44,129

53

38

5833

18

227

379,517

30,094

51

31

1997

26

1834

1,122,342

15,911

40

29

3846

16

65,460

..

..

15668

19

89**

183,041

39,076

49

45

6960

24

335

1,100,617

78,850

12

32

8299

*

Note: #computed using the number of jurisdictions in level. Between brackets when the authorities are not
elected. In Peru are two kinds of municipalities: provincials and districts.
*In Bolivia there are departments, provinces (not elected authorities: 112), municipalities and
territories of traditional peoples ―territorios indígneas originarios campesinos‖ (incorporated in the
new constitution)
** In Uruguay, the municipalities that have been in the constitution were last year.
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As of 2010, there were over 16,000 municipal governments in Latin America.
Their number by country obviously varies with population size and territory, with Brazil
counting 5,564 municipalities and at the other extreme and Trinidad and Tobago with 16
municipalities. Local governments vary quite considerably in size in each country (Table
1).
Even though a significant share of the population of Latin American countries live
in the largest city in the country (for example, 53% in Panama, 49% in Uruguay, 40 % in
Peru, and 35 % in Argentina), the majority of municipalities in the region remain, for the
most part, small in size and of a rural nature. For example, in Peru over 200
municipalities have populations under 1,000 inhabitants, and over 50 percent of the all
municipalities have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Thus the region faces challenges at the
two extremes: massive metropolises with high levels of population density, congestion
and rings of urban poverty; and very small municipalities in rural areas with low density,
with low administrative capacity and lacking an appropriate scale for the provision of
many basic public services.12
In many Latin American countries the structure of local governments continues to
be work in progress.13 For example, for the case of Bolivia, the new 2009 Constitution
declares autonomous governments at the regional, municipal and indigenous community
level, with the characteristic that the indigenous communities may fit in one or more
municipalities or regions. The legal norms regulating this structure have not been enacted
yet. The proliferation of new local governments, almost always through the
fragmentation of existing ones, continues to be quite common in the region. For example
in the Dominican Republic, between 1995 and 2006 the number of municipalities rose
from 108 to 154.14

12

An additional complication is that many municipalities in the region are a mix of urban and rural (and
peri-urban) areas that have very different service needs.
13
This progress has not been lineal either, but rather characterized in many cases by politically driven
episodes of de-centralization and re-centralization. See, for example, Smoke et al. (2006).
14
A recent law in that country has imposed stricter requirements for new potential municipalities requiring
that they have 15,000 residents and be able to generate at least 10 percent of the revenue that their previous
municipality was raising.
7
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Local Expenditures and the Assignment of Competencies
The scope of local government expenditures: The local government share in total
public expenditures and in GDP differs significantly by country but they are generally
lower than those observed in other regions of the world. However, as shown in Table 2,
the share of the public sector in GDP as measured by total expenditures of the general
government is rather high, and at levels above those of other countries in the world at
similar levels of per capita income. This contrast of relatively smaller local government
sectors in otherwise relatively larger overall public sectors may be explained first, by
fewer functional expenditure responsibilities being assigned to local governments in
comparison with other regions of the world, and second, by relatively lower levels of
expenditure and service provision in those expenditure responsibilities actually assigned
to local governments, as discussed below.
As shown in Table 2, there are large differences in the share of local governments
in total public expenditures and their relative importance in GDP. Among the most
decentralized countries, as measured by the municipal share in total public expenditures
are: Ecuador, , Brazil and Colombia around 20 percent, follow by Peru and Bolivia
around 16 percent. Two large federal countries, Argentina and Mexico stand at 6.8
percent and 5.7 percent, respectively. At the low end we find unitary countries that are
still highly centralized such as many Centro-American and Caribbean countries (from 7%
in Salvador, to 1,7% in Panama and Jamaica and between them Dominican Republic,
Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica)).
Perhaps a more meaningful measure of the role of local governments as providers
of public services is the share of local expenditures in overall GDP (Table 2). This
variable measures the percentage of national resources channelled through local
governments. From this perspective, Brazil at 7.7 percent and Bolivia at 7.0 percent and
Ecuador at 5.1 percent are currently the most municipally decentralized countries in the
region, while Peru, Colombia, and Argentina account for between 2 and 3 percent of
GDP. At the bottom stand more centralized countries: Dominican Republic, Panama, El
Salvador and Jamaica, with less than 0.9 percent of GDP.

Municipal Finances in Latin America: Features, Issues, and Prospects
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Table 2: Public Finance Indicators
Total
Expenditure
in general
govt. (Mill
USD)

Country

Argentina(2006)
Bolivia(2008)

Total
Expenditure
in general
govt. (% of
GDP)

44,390.00

30.8

5,503.00

42

Local
Expenditure
(Mill USD)

3,107.30
880.48

2.2

6.8

7

16

7.7

18.7

Brazil(2007)

601,405.00

34.9

Chile(2007)

25,995.00

15.2

3,119.40

2

12.8

Colombia(2006)

48,406.00

14.2

10,165.26

2.7

18.7

Costa Rica(2008)
Dominican
Republic(2006)

58,982.30

38

na

na

na

7,612.00

16

403.00

0.9

5.3

Ecuador(2007)

10,357.00

21.6

2,423.00

5.1

23.3

El Salvador(2007)

3,710.00

18.2

107.90

0.5

3

Guatemala(2002)1

5,174.00

14.5

na

na

na

15

na

na

na

195.00

2.2

9.8

Haiti(2004)

802

Honduras(2004)

1,982.80

112,331.59

Local
Expenditure
(% of GDP)

Local
Expenditure
% of
General
Government

22.4

Jamaica(2008)

4,261.00

73.00

0.7

1.7

Mexico(2007)

327,973.00

28.7

19,678.38

1.6

5.7

Nicaragua(2002)

1,304.50

23.3

na

na

na

Panama(2005)

6,855.20

44.9

137.10

0.8

1.7

Paraguay(2006)

2

38

5,290.80

37.1

Peru(2007)
Trinidad and
Tobago(1995)

16,904.00

16

423.26

0.3

8

2,774.00

2.6

16.4

8,600.00

34.8

0.00

5.2

14.8

Uruguay(2007)

8,611.00

30.8

0.00

na

na

na

na

Venezuela(2007)
58,888.00
25.7
na
Notes:
1
central government only
2
Data from financial statements. Local data partial (only 33% of all Municipalities included)

1
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The assignment of expenditure competencies:

1

Several features characterize

expenditure assignments in Latin American countries. First, with the exception of
Argentina,

15

all countries have explicit assignments for municipalities in the national

laws. In most countries, as shown in Table 3, the expenditure assignments are defined in
the country‘s Constitution; otherwise, the assignments are specified in special laws, most
commonly some form of municipal code.16 Often, in these formal assignments,
municipalities are allowed to provide any services not specifically assigned to any other
level of government.17 The use of the constitution for determining expenditure
assignments can be understood as a sign of status and guarantee for municipal
governments, but generally using the constitution for these purposes can also create
problems because of the difficulty of adding sufficient detail on assignments and the
difficulties of changing and updating assignments in response to frequently evolving
conditions.
Second, there are enormous variations in the assignment of responsibilities to
municipalities; the assignments represent a mosaic of approaches, which as shown in
Annex 1 defy generalization. Most countries provide for a set of obligatory functions,
often exclusively assigned to municipalities (as opposed to shared responsibilities with
other levels of government). These range from basic urban services such as garbage
collection, road maintenance, parks, market stalls and slaughter houses, and so on, as well
as some administrative functions such as, civil registry, land planning and housing
permits. In addition, most countries also provide for voluntary functions, which often are
co-shared with other levels of government. These may include some social services, such
as basic education and primary health services, and public utilities, such as water and
15

In Argentina, each province regulates the expenditure responsibilities of municipalities differently. The
provinces, in general, tend to enumerate a set of general functions accompanied by a clause that may be
used to expand local competencies. Much less frequently the provinces explicitly enumerate the functions
that municipalities must fulfil or functions exclusively assigned to them.
16
There are some qualified exceptions to the rule. For example, in the case of Colombia there is no special
law assigning expenditure responsibilities at different levels of government, but there are several laws (60
of 1993 and 715 of 2001) that specify certain norms regarding the assignment of competencies.
17
A clear exception to this rule is Chile, where municipalities are circumscribed to a closed list of
functions. But unlike the behavior of sub-national governments in other regions of the world showing
eagerness to expand their functional responsibilities, the norm in Latin American countries appears to be
that of little venturing beyond those responsibilities listed in the laws, with perhaps the exception in some
countries (for example Brazil and Mexico) in the area of local economic development.
1
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sewerage services. But as can be seen in Table 3, in some countries (Colombia,
Guatemala, Jamaica) basic education and primary health can also be designated as
obligatory and exclusive responsibilities of local governments18.
Third, fundamental redistributive social welfare services (such as social security,
unemployment compensation, and welfare payments) must be the responsibility of the
central level. However, in some countries (for example, Bolivia and Chile) the central
governments, while retaining the obligation of financing those services, have delegated to
local governments the implementation and management of several important social
welfare programs (e.g., family welfare services) in order to exploit the advantage of
proximity and better information local governments that have.19 Municipal governments
in many Latin American countries play a large role in public investment in infrastructure
at the sub-national level often as equal partners with upper level governments in patterns
similar to those observed in European countries.20 For example, in Brazil local
governments in recent years have undertaken close to 45 percent of all public sector
investment.
Finally, many countries in Latin America have concurrent or shared expenditure
responsibilities, which generally result in less clarity and more potential conflict than
exclusive assignments. There is, however, no clear correlation between the dominance of
concurrent responsibilities and the degree of municipal decentralization. Bolivia, Brazil,
Mexico and Venezuela have considerable co-shared responsibilities, but the first two
have a relatively high degree of municipal decentralization, while the latter two
(especially Venezuela), have among the lowest degree of municipal decentralization. Nor
is there a correlation between the prevalence of exclusive functional assignments and the
level of municipal decentralization. Of course, in some cases, such as the Dominican
Republic, Honduras, and Uruguay, most functional responsibilities are still assigned
exclusively to the central government. In other countries, such as Colombia, Peru, El
Salvador, Guatemala and Jamaica, there is a nontrivial degree of exclusive
18

In El Salvador basic education and primary health are assigned to the local level, but actual service
delivery works through special local mechanisms administrated jointly by the State, the communities and
the private sector.
19
On the whole these experiences appear to have been positive (Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru).In the
case of Mexico some programs have been critiqued because of partisan interference by central authorities
in the deployment of funds.
20
The budget figures are discussed further below.
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responsibilities. In the first two, however, there is a relatively high level of municipal
decentralization, while the latter three have relatively low levels.
Revenue Assignments
Practically all countries of Latin America assign certain taxes to local
governments; some exceptions are El Salvador, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As
shown in Table 3, the most commonly assigned tax is the property tax, although it is
named differently and varies somewhat in scope across countries.21 Other local taxes
include betterment levies, car registration and car permits, real estate and land transfers,
different forms of business licences,22 taxes on gambling and, in a few some form of sales
taxes or business tax based on sales countries ).23 Practically all local governments are
allowed to charge fees and charges for particular public services such as building
licenses, refuse collection, public utilities, slaughter houses, and public markets and
others.
Table 3: Assignment of Taxes and Fees to Local Governments in Latin America
Country

Type of tax
Property

Type of Fees
Others

Argentina

urban/rural property (and its
increased value b/c of public
investment)

car registration, turnover tax

Bolivia

urban/rural property

car registration, car/property
transfers, slaughterhouse,
construction

Brazil

urban property (including
increased value due to
infrastructure improvement)

tax on service sector (ISS),
registered goods tax, real estate
transaction tax

fines, public
utilities

Chile

urban property

car registration, alcohol

public utilities,
fines, permits

21

public utilities,
fines

Of significant importance is that just a handful of countries allow for the taxation of both urban and rural
property. Those countries allowing only the taxation of urban property leave rural municipalities in a
relative disadvantage. Note also that the property tax is still assigned to the central government in El
Salvador and that there appears to be no property tax in the Dominican Republic, only a property transfer
tax.
22
A good example is the ―patente municipal‖ in Chile which is paid annually at rate based on the
declared own capital assets. This tax is further discussed in the next section.
23
In the cases of Brazil‘s ISS (tax on services ) and Colombia‘s ICA (tax on trade and industry) municipal
collections exceed those from the property tax (IBI, impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). The two country
experiences with these taxes are also further discussed in the next section.
3
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Colombia

urban property (and its
increased value b/c of public
investment)

Costa Rica

urban property

surtax on gasoline, tax on
industry/commerce, mineral
extraction, slaughterhouse,
gambling

public utilities,
fines

public utilities

Dominican
Republic
Ecuador

urban/rural (and its increased
value b/c of public
infrastructure investment)

El Salvador

Guatemala

car tags, permits (business,
construction),

fines, utilities

Specific taxes for each
municipality based on congress
approval such as business taxes on
industrial, trade, and financial
activities

fines, public
utilities, fees for
services
rendered

urban property1

tax on wages, advertising
(banners), extraction of
products/economic activity,
alcohol

urban/rural property (and its
increased value b/c of public
investment)

turnover tax on industry and trade,
extraction of natural resources
(fishing, minerals, oil), cattle
slaughter

Haiti
Honduras

public utilities,
firefighters,
fines

Parochial revenue fund

Jamaica
Mexico

Urban property

Car registration (all other taxes are
centralized)

Varies by state

Nicaragua

Urban/Rural property

Sales tax (recently eliminated);
patents and business licenses

fines, public
utilities

Panama

tax on unused land
(urban/rural)

tax on alcohol, economic activity
and vehicles

fines, fees (cattle
slaughter)

Paraguay

urban property (and its
increased value b/c of public
investment)

car registration, games/gambling,
wealth tax (corporate), land
transfers/subdivision

public utilities

Peru

urban/rural property

car registration, car/property
transfers, construction

public utilities,
fees, fines

Uruguay

urban property (and its
increased value b/c of public
investment)

car registration, gambling, shows

fines, fees for
services

Venezuela

urban/rural property

car tags, gambling, economic
activity,

fines, fees for
permits

Trinidad and
Tobago

Notes:
1
Tax collection authority is only given to local governments that prove to have the capacity to collect the
tax
2
Argentina: Not all provinces have delegated property taxes to their municipalities
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Brazil: The ISS is assessed and collected by the municipality at rates set by the municipality but subject to
a maximum fixed by federal law

Revenue assignments are formalized in different ways. In many cases, the
assignments are specified in the general tax laws or in the special municipal laws. In
other cases, they are established in the national constitution, as for example in Brazil. In
some other cases, the constitution delegates to the intermediate level of government,
provinces or states, discretion to determine local revenue assignments, such as in the case
of Argentina and Mexico, which results in a variety of de facto assignments.24
The level of autonomy granted to local governments also varies. As summarized
in Table 4 most countries use a ―closed list‖ approach and do not allow the introduction
of new taxes to local governments; some exceptions include Ecuador and Uruguay. 25 On
the other hand, about two-thirds of the countries in the region allow local governments
the ability to set the rates of some taxes; this practice is widely accepted as the most
desirable form of tax autonomy that can be granted to local governments.26 It is
interesting that countries such as Bolivia and Peru, where decentralization reforms have
advanced rapidly in recent years, still grant no discretion to set tax rates. A reduced
number of countries in the region grant local discretion to modify tax base.27 Most
countries in the region allow local government discretion in fixing the levels of fees and
user charges for local government services. Nevertheless, an important restriction on the
revenue autonomy of local governments is the practice followed in several countries of
requiring local government revenue budgets (―plan de arbitrios‖) to be previously
approved by a higher tier of government prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.28 As can
24

In the case of Mexico, the constitution assigns the real estate taxes (and only the real state tax) to the
municipalities. This is the only tax explicitly assigned to the municipalities..
25
In Argentina, some provinces may also allow their local governments to introduce new taxes but under
quite restrictive guidelines.
26
There is not a lot of information available on how this autonomy is actually used, but it would appear that
it is quite common for local governments to adopt the lower rates authorized in the law.
27
Generally, this form of tax autonomy is also considered less desirable, although there may be less of a
problem in changes in the bases of taxes with rather immobile bases such as land and buildings. But even in
these cases the use of different bases may make more difficult the measurement of fiscal capacity across
jurisdictions.
28
There are two versions of this prior approval. In one version the approval works as simple legality where
the higher level cannot change resource allocation decisions. In the second version, the higher level can
change decisions of the lower level. The practice in the regions seems to be more in the nature of the first
version where approval by the higher level works more as a check that the regulatory framework is being
followed.
5
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be seen in Table4 this is still a practice in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay;
in Mexico this approval comes at the intermediate level from the state governments. In
terms of fiscal administration (Table 4), the general rule is local responsibility for the
administration of local taxes, fees and charges, although in some cases tax administration
responsibility is shared with the central authorities.29
Table 4: Autonomy Granted in Revenue Assignments to Local Governments and
Responsibility for the Collection and Administration of Local Taxes and Fees
Responsibility for
the collection of:

Ability to
introduce
new taxes

Ability to
set tax
rates within
legal limits

Ability to
change tax
base

Control or veto
over local govt.
budgets by
Central/Regional
govt.

Argentina

Yes

yes

Yes

No

L

L

Bolivia

No

no

No

Central

C/R

C

Brazil

Yes

yes

Yes

No

L

L

Chile

No

yes

Yes

No

L

L

Colombia

No

yes

No

No

L

L

Costa Rica

No

No

No

Central

PS*

PS*

Dominican Republic

No

no

No

No

C

C

Ecuador

Yes

yes

No

No

L

L

El Salvador

Yes

yes

No

No

L

L

Guatemala

No

yes

No

No

L

C/L

Haiti

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Na

na

C

Honduras

No

yes

No

No

L

L

Jamaica

No

yes

Yes

Central

L

C/L

Mexico

No

no

No

Regional

L

L

Nicaragua

No

yes

Yes

Central

L

L

Panama

No

yes

No

Central

L

C/L

Paraguay

No

no

No

Central

L

C/L

Peru

No

no

No

No

L

L

Trinidad and Tobago

no

no

No

No

L

C/L

Uruguay

yes

Yes

No

Central

L

L

Yes

No

L

L

Country

yes
Yes
Venezuela
Note *: Costa Rica collects through the private sector

Fees

taxes

Property taxes remain the great unrealized promise for local tax autonomy in
Latin America, a problem that is shared with other regions of the world. In most countries
29

As an exception, it appears that in Bolivia all local taxes are collected and administered by the central
authorities.
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in the region, the yield from property tax remains far below its potential. While the
property tax on average in recent years raises revenues of 2.12 percent of GDP in OECD
countries, 0.68 percent in transition countries, and 0.60 percent in developing countries,
the average in Latin America is only 0.37 percent of GDP. The reasons for low
performance are multiple, including low political will –from the national government as
well as from the Parliament and the local governments themselves- and the disincentive
effects of revenue sharing and inter-governmental fiscal transfers (IGFTs), as well as
outdated and poorly equipped tax administrations. These factors translate into generous
exemptions and low tax rates, obsolete and infrequent property value assessments,
incomplete registries and cadastres and a lack of willingness and means of enforcing
collections. This lacklustre performance varies little with the different arrangements in
the region for discretion on rate setting or administration of the property tax.30
More generally, the whole range of local raised revenues from own taxes and fees
in Latin America represent a relatively small share of total consolidated revenues in the
public sector, although in terms of the share in local budgets these revenues are relatively
large.31 Of course, there is a large variation in experience from country to country. Table
5 shows that as percent of consolidated government revenues, local governments in
Colombia raise 22 percent, Brazil and Peru 18 percent and Bolivia, 16 percent. At the
lower end stand Panama with 2 percent.32 For Mexico this figure is 6 percent.
However, on average, municipalities raise a higher percentage of their budgets
from own revenues that is the case in some other regions of the world, including Africa,
Asia and a good portion of European countries. As shown in Table 5, the percent of local
budgets financed out of own taxes and fees is quite high, between one quarter and over
half for many countries. 33However, in Bolivia this share is only 11 percent, in Brazil 20
percent and in Mexico, 16 percent.

30

For a discussion of the issues, see Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) and De Cesare and Lazo
Marín (2008).
31
These two effects are compatible if we recall our discussion in the previous section that local government
budgets represent a relatively small share of the general government budget.
32
See Annex 2 for the breakdown of revenues collected by each tier of government. In Venezuela the
figures seems to be extremely low probably due to reporting issues; some large municipalities in Venezuela
appear to collect property taxes and fees.
33
See Annexe3 in the Appendix for the breakdown of sources of revenues for local governments.
7
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Table 5: Shares of Local Own Revenues (in percentages)
Local government
revenues as % of
total govt. revenues

Own taxes and fees
as % of local
revenues

Local own taxes and
fees as % of GDP

Argentina(2006)

7.0%

49.8%

1.2%

Bolivia(2008)

16.0%

11.4%

2.7%

Brazil(2007)

17.6%

20.1%

1.8%

Chile(2007)

9.0%

63.0%

0.7%

Colombia(2006)

22.0%

41.2%

2.1%

58.4%

0.7%

34.6%

1.6%

El Salvador(2007)

69.9%

0.0%

Haiti(2004)

25.0%

0.5%

Country (Most recent year)

Dominican Republic(2006)
Ecuador(2007)

12.0%

Honduras(2004)

8.0%

58.1%

0.9%

Jamaica(2008)

0.0%

100.0%

0.2%

Mexico(2007)

6.0%

15.6%

2.4%

44.0%

0.6%

Nicaragua(2002)
Panama(2005)

2.0%

49.0%

0.3%

Paraguay(2006)

8.0%

34.1%

1.2%

Peru(2007)

18.0%

43.2%

2.6%

52.9%

0.1%

Trinidad and Tobago(1995)

0.0%

Uruguay(2007)
Venezuela(2007)

0.0%

94.9%

0.1%

Intergovernmental Transfers
Because of the limited extent of fiscal autonomy, practically all local governments
suffer from vertical imbalances, i.e. the expenditure needs arising from their functional
competences exceed their ability to self finance them. Although the existence of vertical
imbalance is not in dispute, their actual extent is generally a polemical issue because
practically no country in the region has introduced explicit methodologies to measure the
expenditure needs of local governments in a transparent and objective manner. In order to
address the existing vertical imbalances, practically all countries in the region implement
a range of fiscal transfers, often consisting of different forms of revenue sharing, an array
of specific or conditional grants, and in some cases, equalization grants.
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In addition to vertical imbalances, in practically all countries in the region there
are also significant horizontal imbalances between local governments. These imbalances
are the result of the different tax capacities and economic bases of local governments and
also of different expenditure needs arising from differences in the costs of service
delivery and differences in the profiles and needs of the resident populations. Horizontal
imbalances are most pronounced between urban and rural municipalities and between
smaller and larger urban centers. As we see below, different approaches are used in the
region to address these horizontal imbalances.
The emphasis throughout the region has been on addressing the problem of
vertical imbalances through different forms of revenue sharing with central government
tax collections. There has been less emphasis on the design of explicit equalization
grants, although quite often revenue sharing formulas contain equalization features.
Conditional grants are less common in Latin America than in other regions of the world,
but here again there are important exceptions.
The large variety of country approaches followed, as shown in Table A.5 in the
Appendix, makes it hard to synthesize them in a brief space.
Nevertheless, most countries in the region use some form of general revenue
sharing. The pool of funds is most frequently defined on the basis of central government
general revenues or their most important sources; this is the case, for example, of Bolivia,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In
other cases, the pool is based on specific central government taxes; for example, 20
percent of the fees on oil production derived by the Mexican states must be passed on to
their municipalities; Nicaragua‘s additional tax sharing with the municipalities is based
on revenues from natural resources; and in Peru, some of the tax sharing is from a share
of the sales taxes and from gas and oil extraction proceeds (canon, sobrecanon, and
canon petrolero). In these latter cases, actual transfers can be subject to considerable
fluctuations, for example, depending on international price levels for natural resources.
In some cases, shared revenues are distributed on a derivation (i.e. origin) basis,
for example, the canon, sobrecanon, and canon petrolero in Peru. This approach (sharing
revenues from natural resources on a derivation basis) has become a significant factor
adding up to regional horizontal fiscal imbalances. Most often some sort of formula is
9
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used for the distribution of resources that includes several variables, some of which, as
noted above, may have equalizing features.34 For example, in Bolivia revenue sharing is
based solely on population; in Ecuador it is according to population and relative poverty
levels; in El Salvador it is according to population, ‗equity‘ (a fixed amount for each
municipality), poverty, and land surface area; in Guatemala it is distributed according to a
formula that includes equal shares (fixed amounts), population, number of settlements,
and per capita income; in Honduras it is according to population and equal amounts for
all municipalities; in Nicaragua it is according to population and several other criteria;
and in Peru it is according to population and infant mortality rates. Frequently, the
formulas are also employed by central governments to pursue several objectives other
than equalization. For example, in Ecuador the sharing formula includes elements for
rewarding administrative effort and achieving goals in the national development plan,
while in Nicaragua the formula provides incentives for increasing revenues from property
tax and for achieving more effective budget execution.
Some countries allow unconditional use of shared revenue, including Bolivia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras. But in other cases the use of funds is conditional.
For example, in Colombia the use of revenue sharing funds is earmarked for basic
education, health, and water and sewerage; in Guatemala, for education, health and
infrastructure; in Nicaragua and Paraguay, a share of the funds --80 percent in the latter
case-- must be spent on infrastructure investment.
Revenue sharing practices in the federal countries have some similarities with
those of unitary countries, but there are also some different features. In Argentina, tax
sharing with local governments is carried out exclusively by the provincial governments,
which can decide how to distribute their share of federal VAT and income taxes. The
Brazilian states also have a tax sharing system funded with 25 percent of their regional
VAT revenues, which is distributed 75 percent on a derivation basis according to value
added in the municipalities and 25 percent by a formula based on population, land area
and others. This same formula is used to distribute federal tax sharing with the states
34

In some cases, like in Paraguay, the allocation of funds is still ad-hoc at the discretion of the central
authorities. In this context it is worth mentioning that there used to be more widespread ad hoc allocation of
funds in the region, but now most countries, with limited exceptions, have moved to the better practice of
formula based determination of the pool of funds.
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(cooperation funds) to the municipalities. In Mexico, the states are required to distribute
to their municipalities at least 20 percent of the income that they receive from revenue
sharing in the federal funds (Fondo de Fiscalización and Fondo General de
participaciones). Mexico also has a federal grant, amounting to 1 percent of federal
collections (Fondo de Fomento Municipal) that is (distributed on the basis of municipal
revenue collections. In Venezuela, 25 percent of tax revenues from hydrocarbons and
mining are earmarked for use in health, education and housing and distributed to
municipalities largely on a mix of the derivation principle and population size; in
addition, in Venezuela 15 percent of VAT revenues are distributed to municipalities on
the basis of population, poverty, and land area and earmarked for local infrastructure.
Conditional or specific transfers are less extensively used in Latin American than
in other regions of the world.35 Nevertheless their use is increasing, especially in those
countries where central governments count on being associated with local governments
as partners for the delivery of certain services and the implementation of national
programs.36 For example, Bolivia has introduced a conditional health transfer for a
national program in support of infants and mothers (seguro materno infantil). In Brazil,
several conditional grants have been introduced for public transport (funded by the
sharing of federal fuel levies), for basic education, and for health services, including
hospitals from the national health system. In Chile several highly conditional grants have
for many years funded local governments‘ activities in education, health, and other social
programs. Some conditional grants are earmarked for certain geographical areas that are
deemed to be lagging behind. For example, in Ecuador there is a conditional capital
investment grant for the Amazon region.37
35

Here we are referring in a conventional way to specific funds assigned to particular objectives and
administered separately by central government agencies. This is interpreted as being different from the
conditioning or earmarking of revenue sharing funds. As we have seen above, a number of countries in the
region condition the use of revenue sharing funds to investment in infrastructure and so on. If the
restrictions in the use of revenue sharing funds were included in the general category of conditional
transfers then the practices in the regions would not be that different from those in other regions of the
world.
36
In a traditional way experienced in other regions of the world, the rise of conditional transfers has been
more to assist the center in better implementing its programs and less in providing incentives to local
governments to improve local functions.
37
This is a specific instance of larger developmental goals that can be addressed by conditional transfers,
such as arid areas, poor areas, unexploited high potential areas, etc.

11

12

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

A particular subgroup of conditional grants is earmarked for investment in local
infrastructure. For example, El Salvador offers grants for municipal capital infrastructure
based on the presentation of project proposals. In Guatemala one-eighth of VAT revenues
are earmarked for infrastructure in social and basic services while a share of vehicle taxes
is earmarked for maintenance and improvements of roads and drainage. In Mexico, at
least 20% of the investment grants (Fondo de Compensación) from the federal
government must be assigned to the poorest ten states in the country and used by the
municipalities of those states.
The practice of explicitly addressing horizontal disparities among local
governments through equalization transfers is still not common but it is taking hold in the
region. One reason for the slow introduction of explicit equalization grants is that quite
often revenue sharing schemes do incorporate some equalization elements in their
allocation formulas. Several examples of existing equalization grants (above and beyond
revenue sharing schemes with some equalizing elements in their formulas) are worth
mentioning. One is Bolivia‘s HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative) transfers
started in 1997 with funds from international organizations (the World Bank and the
IMF) and distributed by the central government to local governments using a formula
based on the poverty level and population of municipalities. In Brazil, there is a federal
equalization transfer to the municipalities funded with a share of federal VAT and
income tax revenues; the fund is split into two parts, with 10 percent going to state capital
municipalities (distributed according to population and the inverse of per capita income)
and the other 90 percent to the rest of the municipalities (distributed according to an
index that favours municipalities with smaller populations). An interesting approach is
that of Chile, where the formula driven equalization grant (the Common Municipal Fund)
is funded by the municipalities‘ own revenues from different sources in what is known in
the technical parlance as a ―fraternal‖ (or Robin Hood) system, in which the relatively
richer municipalities finance the transferred amounts to the poorer municipalities. The
allocation formula includes population size, poverty levels, exempted real estate property,
and past revenue collections. One key positive feature in all these examples is the
recognition of the need to introduce a separate instrument (equalization grants) to address
the separate objective of horizontal inequalities arising from different expenditure needs
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and fiscal capacity.38 A key common challenge ahead is the need to improve the
methodologies used to quantify the expenditures needs and fiscal capacity of the different
local governments. 39
Borrowing
Given their expenditure responsibilities, most municipalities have a need for longterm finance for capital infrastructure. Local borrowing can be considered a legitimate,
efficient, and equitable source for financing this local infrastructure. However, it is also
widely accepted that the process of local borrowing must be subject to explicit rules and
limitations in order to ensure fiscally responsible behavior by local officials and to
guarantee macroeconomic stability in the country.40 Commonly applied rules include
those about expected behavior, such as the ―golden rule‖ that long-term borrowed funds
must be used for capital infrastructure only, and not for recurrent expenditures, and
different quantitative budgetary limits on borrowing. Among the latter, there are rules on
non-negative current budget balances, limits on the level of total debt and debt-service
payments as a percent of budget revenues, as well as restrictions on borrowing abroad.

38

The use of a fraternal system to fund the equalization transfers in Chile is also a promising innovation.
This is a system common to a good number of European countries but it is uncertain how easily it will be
adopted by other countries in the region.
39
For the available methodologies used in other regions of the world see, for example, Martinez-Vazquez
and Searle (2007).
40
Historically this was not always widely accepted in some countries in the region, which in past decades
saw an accumulation of macroeconomic difficulties associated with unfettered sub-national borrowing in
some of the federations and politicized government-run municipal development banks.
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Table 6: Authority to Borrow by Local Governments in Latin America
Country

Access to Financial Markets

Municipal Bank

Limitations

Argentina

Y

Y

Y

Bolivia

Y

N

Y

Brazil

Y

N

Y

Chile

N

N

n.a

Colombia

Y

n.a

Y

Costa Rica

Y

n.a

n.a

Dominican Republic

N

Y

Y

Ecuador

N

N

Y

El Salvador

N

Y

Y

Guatemala

Y

n.a

Y

Haiti

n.a

n.a

n.a

Honduras

Y

Y

Y

Jamaica

N

N

Y

Mexico

Y

N

Y

Nicaragua

Y

n.a

Y

Panama

n.a

n.a

n.a

Paraguay

Y

N

n.a

Peru

Y

N

Y

Trinidad and Tobago

N

N

n.a

Uruguay

Y

N

Y

Venezuela

Y

Y

na

For a variety of reasons, ranging from fiscal conservatism to negative past
experience, not all countries in the world allow their local governments to borrow. Yet in
the case of Latin America, as shown in Table 6, most countries do allow local
governments to borrow.41 Practically all countries allow such borrowing even though
they impose rules and limitations on local borrowing similar to the above-mentioned
international ‗good practice‘ guidelines. In most cases, foreign borrowing is not allowed,
in some cases it is allowed with permission of the higher authorities, and in other cases
even domestic borrowing requires administrative approval by higher level authorities.42
Over time, national systems have adapted to particular idiosyncrasies and approaches.
41

The exceptions include Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago.
42
For example, foreign borrowing by the municipalities in Argentina requires administrative approval at
the provincial level and by the Ministry of Economy at the national level, which it has been argued has
been subject to political criteria beyond technical aspects. .
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For example, in Nicaragua, municipalities are able to contract short or medium term
loans from public and private banks for public works, with long-term loans for largescale public works approved by the National Assembly. Loans must be repaid within the
term of the elected officials, as mayors and municipal councils may not leave debts to
their successors, except for long-term loans approved by the National Assembly. In the
case of Colombia, law 358 of 1997 introduced a system of ―semáforos‖ (streetlights)
restricting the level of local debt according to the ability to pay by the local units; if
interest payments are below 40 percent of the operational surplus and if the debt level is
under 80 percent of current revenues, local governments are free to borrow according to
the law; however, they require permission to borrow from the Ministry of Finance if any
of those limits is exceeded. With law 819, which came into effect in 2003, the necessity
to have a primary surplus sufficient to cover the repayments and interest was added to the
existing indicators. The three indicators must be positive in every year of the loan, and
this must be reflected in the medium term fiscal framework of the municipality or
department. In El Salvador, municipalities are able to borrow from commercial banks
once they receive the proper quality ranking from the Ministry of Finance and the semiofficial organization charged with the physical distribution of the general transfer funds
to the municipalities establishes an intercept agreement for those transfers to work as
collateral for the loans from the commercial banks. As in other countries around the
world, it is common to impose limits on annual debt service as percent of revenues (for
example 20 percent in Argentina and Bolivia or 40 percent in Ecuador) and/or the total
stock of debt as percent of total revenues (120 percent in Brazil or under 100 percent in
Ecuador and Peru.)
The actual amount of sub-national debt, which includes local and provincial/state
debt, is quite low in most countries, with the exception of Brazil and Argentina, where
sub-national debt represents in recent times between 10 and 15 percent of GDP; Mexico,
Colombia and Bolivia come behind with sub-national government debt representing less
than 2 percent of GDP as of 2007. However, for municipal governments alone in recent
years, Bolivia is first in debt service (interest and repayment of principal) as percent of
total municipal expenditures at around 9 percent, followed by Ecuador at around 8
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percent. For Argentinean and Brazilian municipalities, debt service as percent of total
municipal expenditures is round 4 percent.43
Budgeting
The budgeting process at the local level in most Latin American countries is still
carried out along traditional lines with heavy emphasis on incremental budgeting and exante and financial audit controls for the disbursement of funds. Much less attention is
given to the planning of expenditure programs and ex-post evaluation of the effectiveness
of funds disbursed on programmatic goals.44 One positive aspect is that almost without
exception, local budgets need to be approved by democratically elected local councils.
However, as we have seen above, in a significant number of countries (Bolivia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay) at least
some components of the local budgets need to be approved ex-ante by some higher level
authorities at the central or regional levels. It is questionable whether or not these
approvals are really needed; international best practice is to rely on horizontal
accountability mechanisms ex-ante, and on the ex-post audit and to grant full budgetary
autonomy to local governments.45
―Participatory budgeting‖ is an area of innovation in several countries in the
region that has attracted much international attention. The specific meaning of this term
varies among those countries that have introduced this type of reform, but it generally
means additional mechanisms for citizens to influence local budgetary decisions beyond
the conventional vehicle of representative democracy through the democratic elections of
municipal councilors.46 For example, in Bolivia a 1994 law established a mechanism of
citizen participation in the local budget process through citizen committees (comités de
vigilancia) and community-based organizations (OTBs—organizaciones de base), that
43

See Porto (2009).
The strong emphasis on ex-ante treasury controls has not, on the other hand, reduced corruption, which,
with some exceptions, still appears to be extensive among local governments (and the rest of the public
sector) in the region. The difficulties lie more in poor execution of the ex-ante controls than in a deficient
design.
44

45

In some cases controls for checking the legality of actions, as opposed to changing budget allocation
decisions, can be justified when horizontal accountability and audit mechanisms are deficient or not present
at all.
46
Somewhat related, citizen participation mechanisms such as referendums, ―popular initiatives,‖ and
elected representative recalls have been operating in other regions of the world.
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are social organizations of peasant communities, indigenous population, and
neighbourhood groups. Citizen participation at the local level is also important in Brazil,
but what participation actually entails varies considerably across states and even
municipalities. In Brazil the participatory budgeting process has been accompanied by a
great variety of experiments; in some cases groups of citizens are empowered to address
social and political inequalities by influencing the allocation of budget resources through
neighbourhood meetings.47 Other countries in the region, including some provinces in
Argentina, have formally adopted participatory budgeting. So far there are accounts of
specific local government successes in Brazil and elsewhere of increasing ordinary
citizen input and preferences in budget decisions.48 On the other hand, participatory
budgeting is appropriate for certain elements of the budget; thus, even in Porto Alegre
(Brazil) the share of the budget subject to this process is limited. Other countries in the
region have formally adopted participative budgeting. Nevertheless, the implementation
of participative budgeting often depends on the will of the Mayor and the City Council as
it is not a compulsory or permanent tool.
As for the composition of municipal budgets, data availability varies significantly
across countries and our discussion is based on a small number of countries. In terms of
the economic classification of local expenditures, the high share of capital infrastructure
expenditures in the municipal budgets of a significant number of countries is notable
(Table 7). For example, in both Chile and Ecuador, local governments spend 55 percent
of their budgets on capital expenditures; in Guatemala this figure is 64 percent and in
Peru, 58 percent. Of course, there are large variations for these figures across countries,
and these variations have a lot to do with the assignment of expenditure responsibilities—
what tier of government is responsible for capital infrastructure in the different areas of
responsibility: schools, roads, etc –, and also with the legal restrictions imposed on local
governments for how they can spend revenue sharing and other types of funds—for
example, in Peru, local governments only can spend funds from the canon and
sobrecanon from natural resources on capital investments. There is also the possibility
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See Afonso (2006).
For a positive assessment in the case of Bolivia, see Faguet (2004). See also Goldfrank (2006) and Shah
(2007) for general assessments.
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that capital expenditures are over reported.49 But whatever the explanation, it is clear that
many local governments in Latin America have been given an important role to play in
the task of providing much needed infrastructure. This highlights the importance of
finding more stable and potent instruments for infrastructure finance.

Table 7: Budget Expenditure by Economic Classification of Local Governments
Wages and
Salaries/ Pension
funds (% of
total)

Current
expenditure other
than wages and
salaries
(% of total)

Capital Expenditure/
debt/equipment
(% of total)

Argentina(2006)

47.40%

29.27%

23.33%

Bolivia(2008)

65.80%

26.90%

7.30%

Brazil(2007)

46.74%

53.05%

0.21%

Chile(2007)

29.11%

15.66%

55.23%

Colombia(2006)

74.05%

1.96%

23.98%

Ecuador(2007)

23.60%

20.80%

55.60%

El Salvador(2007)

45.61%

39.78%

14.60%

Guatemala(2002)

0.00%

36.00%

64.00%

Honduras(2004)

30.42%

19.03%

50.55%

Mexico(2007)

82.83%

12.29%

4.88%

Nicaragua(2002)

23.08%

38.46%

38.46%

Panama(2005)

41.68%

55.24%

3.08%

Paraguay(2006)

71.99%

10.94%

17.07%

Peru(2007)

11.73%

30.31%

57.95%

Venezuela(2007)

33.22%

33.31%

33.47%

Country
(Most recent year)

As we have seen, the movement toward open and participatory budgeting is
spreading in the region increasing budget efficiency and accountability in general.
Although participatory budgeting is not directly about decentralization itself, the
movement toward participatory budgeting has tended to reinforce decentralized
institutions. There are, however, exceptions; for example, in the Dominican Republic,

49

There are incentives in many countries in the region to report some current expenditure as capital
expenditure. For example, in some cases central legislation restricts the share of budgets that can go to
recurrent purposes. In other cases, practically all kinds of current expenditures have been demonized as
being inefficient so local authorities actually report some current expenditure as actually being some form
of capital expenditure. But, fortunately there does not appear to be a problem in Latin America with the offbudget programs and expenditures that are common in other regions of the world, for example Africa and
Asia.
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Law 176 of 2007 goes a long way to introduce participatory budgeting but the actual
level of decentralization to local governments in that country remains quite weak.
Even less data is available to obtain a panoramic view of the functional
classification of local budgets in the region; even for those countries for which data are
available for individual municipalities, comparisons are hard because of the different
classification methods used in each country, and, of course, because of different
assignments of responsibilities, different needs and cost levels, and so on. As shown in
Table 8, education expenditures, deriving from the assignment of expenditure
competencies, are an important item in the local budgets of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and
Colombia; in all these countries, education expenditures represent between 22 and 37
percent of the local budgets. For the same reason, expenditures on health services are
relatively important in the local budgets of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, with budget
shares here ranging between 16 and 22 percent. It is noteworthy that in most of these
countries for which disaggregated data are available, not surprisingly the most important
expenditure item in terms of budget shares is ―general administration.‖50
Table 8: Shares of Local Government Expenditure by Functional Classification
General
administration
(% of total)

Education
(% of total)

Health
(% of
total)

Argentina(2006)

28.69%

4.31%

9.93%

0.00%

7.35%

49.72%

Bolivia(2008)

4.77%

22.15%

7.20%

1.41%

n.a.

64.47%

Brazil(2007)

17.86%

25.99%

21.94%

2.97%

3.05%

28.20%

Chile(2007)

42.84%

36.86%

11.89%

0.00%

0.00%

8.42%

Colombia(2006)

18.56%

26.51%

19.58%

3.76%

0.00%

31.58%

Peru(2007)

30.72%

9.79%

16.06%

0.00%

20.08%

23.35%

Venezuela(2007)

26.27%

3.04%

9.31%

n.a.

11.37%

50.00%

Country
(Most recent year)

Sanitation Transport
(% of total) (% of total)

Others
(% of
total)

II. Special Issues, Constraints and Opportunities for Local and
Intergovernmental Finance in the Region
As shown in Section 1, the Latin American region offers a vast array of different
experiences and approaches to local finance. The kinds of issues facing local
50

Expenditures in U.S. dollars and the share of the different local sectoral expenditures in GDP are shown
in Table A.7 in the Appendix.
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governments in large federal countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are often
very different from those affecting local governments in small countries such as El
Salvador, Nicaragua, or Paraguay. Furthermore, there is also significant diversity among
the large federal countries as well as among the unitary countries. Hence, the attempt to
generalize in the analysis of local problems and their solutions is neither always possible
nor desirable. The analysis is intended to help policymakers develop a better
understanding of the issues and explore potential remedies in a particular case—not to
prescribe general solutions to problems that, even if at one level are similar, are
happening in different contexts Nevertheless, some themes common to a significant
number of countries in the region—even if in somewhat different ways and degrees—
clearly emerge from the description of the local finance system presented in Section 1. In
this section we identify some of the special issues, constraints and opportunities for the
development of local finance in Latin America. The section is organized around four
major themes: (a) Organizational Structure; (b) Intergovernmental Fiscal System Design;
(c) Budget Process and Transparency; and (d) Short Terms and Long Term Structural
Challenges.
II.a Issues on Organizational Structure
Fragmentation and sub-optimal scale51
Many countries in the region have numerous local governments that are too small
to take advantage of economies of scales in the delivery of public services. Often this
problem is aggravated by the incentives provided for further fragmentation by transfer
formulas that ensure fixed amounts of funds to each municipality, regardless of size.52 In
response to this problem some countries have introduced legislation requiring minimum
population size in order to ensure the future fiscal viability of any new local government.
This action can be effective in slowing down the process of further fragmentation but it
does not help to address the inadequate scale of the already existing municipalities. Even

51

The issues of local fragmentation and administrative capacity have a significant political component and
from that perspective they were reviewed in GOLD I. Our main perspective here is on how fragmentation
and administrative capacity may affect the fiscal sustainability of local governments.
52
For example, in El Salvador, the Fund for Economic and Social Development (FODES), which is the
main source of local revenues, is distributed according to a formula that distributes 25 percent of the funds
evenly to all municipalities.
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though many countries offer voluntary consolidation or amalgamation programs, these
measures, as is the experience in other regions of the world afflicted with the same
problem, tend to be quite ineffective even when accompanied by financial incentives for
the municipalities involved; in fact voluntary amalgamation of local governments has
been very rare in the region. One solution is the forced amalgamation by central mandate.
But even though this approach has been used by some countries outside the Latin
America region, the approach can be quite disruptive and politically difficult to
implement, which explains why it has never been used in the region. Perhaps a more
attractive and potentially equally effective approach is the promotion and creation of
associations of municipalities into mancomunidades for the delivery of certain public
services requiring certain minimum scale.53 This is an approach still largely unexploited
but it is currently being developed in some countries, especially in southern Brazil,
Ecuador or Peru.54
The trade-off between economies of scale and representation55
The issue of an optimal scale of local governments presents an inherent tradeoff
between the (potential) better political connection in terms of representation and
accountability of smaller jurisdictions with the (potential) greater fiscal viability of larger
jurisdictions. Thus, the issue of jurisdiction size is not only or primarily a technical issue,
but also one that involves political considerations.56 Economies of scale allow greater

53

However, these programs can be difficult to implement. For example, in El Salvador, the National Plan
for Territorial Development and Organization (PNODT) was supposed to promote mancomunidades and
general cooperation among local governments which would allow them to lower administrative costs by
working together to print jointly needed forms and gathering regularly to share ideas. However, local
governments remain uncoordinated and have for the most part failed to work together and take advantage
of economies of scale where applicable.
54
Other approaches to dealing with the problem of inadequate scale include the contracting out to private
companies of some services, so that private companies can benefit from sufficient scale by supplying
different municipalities, or the creation of ‗sector specific‘ service governments or districts. The
privatization of services is being used in several Latin American countries quite successfully; the creation
of special districts or single purpose jurisdictional arrangements, quite common in North America, has been
adopted at some level in some countries in Central America (El Salvador, Nicaragua) for the administration
of health and education (SILOS-SILAIS, etc). Special districts do the same thing as mancomunidades, but
these latter are purely voluntary. See Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez (2008) for a discussion of the issues
and solutions.
55
See Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez (2008) and Imansyah and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) for a more
extensive discussion of this issue.
56
From this perspective, it is interesting to note how some larger local governments organize themselves;
for example, in the case of Bogotá, the sub-mayoralities receive modest grants for community participatory
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efficiency in services production thanks to the greater size of service areas covered with
the union of local governments. Nevertheless, the responsiveness to the needs and
preferences of residents and accountability of public officials tend to deteriorate with size
or scale. to the local government.
The essence of this trade-off between the greater efficiency of smaller
governments that can better match local preferences and desires of local residents in their
expenditure allocation and economies of scale in production with lower costs associated
with larger governments implies a compromise solution between the two objectives. In
particular, it implies that lower cost effectiveness in the delivery of public services may
be offset by greater efficiency in responding to the needs and preferences of local
residents.
Local administrative capacity
Closely associated with the problem of small size is the lack of administrative
capacity of local governments in many countries. Interestingly, one effect of
decentralization reforms in the region has been the distancing between central
government agencies and municipalities. Central governments (or state or provincial
governments in the case of federal countries) spend too little time and resources in
developing the capacity of local governments.57 Some of the slack has been taken up by
municipal government associations, which, for example in some of the Andean countries
and in Central America, provide their members with assistance and training. However,
these associations often lack the resources necessary to address this issue. Central (or
provincial–state) governments can do much more. Some best practices do exist in the
region (see Box 1) and could be imitated in other countries.
Summarizing, there are no exact answers or methodologies to address the issues
of optimal size for municipalities. Several goals need to be pursued including cost

decision making, while larger metropolitan/network infrastructure decisions are made and implemented by
the city government.
57
The Latin America region shows a lower prevalence of Ministries of Local Government/Interior/Home
Affairs that are more prevalent in other regions of the world and higher presence of special agencies
designed to exclusively address the needs of local governments, such as ISEDM y FISDL in El Salvador or
INIFOM in Nicaragua. In general, it is easier for these types of specialized agencies to play a supporting
and capacity development role than it is for sectoral ministries; the downside is that the specialized
agencies tend pull a lower rank within the government administrations in the bargain for additional
resources.
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efficiency and representation and accountability and several constraints need to be met
regarding fiscal viability and administrative capacity. See Box 2.
Box 1: Developing Local Administrative Capacity in Chile
Although Chile is not by any means a highly decentralized country in the Latin America region, it has
had several successful programs dedicated to strengthening the administrative capacity that could serve
as a best practice for the region. An important ingredient of this success is that municipal governments
maintain a stable number of employees –with the support of the law- and that they can pay relatively
competitive wages, comparable with private sector levels, so that municipalities are able to better retain
professional and technical staff.58 Chile‘s municipal institutions have been strengthened through new
municipal development initiatives such as: the Municipal Development Program (PROFIM), the
Program of Innovation and Best Local Government Practices, the Program for Regional and Institutional
Development, the Program for Information Technology and Communications and the National System
of Municipal Information. Each of these programs has been designed to strengthen a specific aspect of
municipal administrative capacity and have been in operation for the past fifteen years, often funded by
foreign governments and multilateral agencies.
PROFIM was designed to improve the management capacity of local governments in planning,
productive development, financial management, human resources, and management of social services.
The program was implemented in two phases. The first, between 1993 and 1999, included only 24
municipalities, and the second, between 1999 and 2004, was extended to include a further 100
municipalities.
The Program of Innovation and Best Local Government Practices encourages municipal officials who
wish to innovate in both technological and social programs through a competition that invites all
municipal officials in the country to submit their best initiatives and innovative projects. Those selected
participate in exchange programs to learn about good practices in other national or foreign
municipalities.
The Program for Information Technology and Communications for municipal management and citizen
control promotes the creation of electronic portals open to the public for information on municipal
procedures and the delivery of municipal services.
The National System for Municipal Information (SINIM), allows access via Internet to different
indicators –by municipality, region or for the whole of the country‘s local governments- on management,
finance, staff, public services, education, health and other key aspects of the Chilean municipal
functioning. (see: www.sinim.cl).
A few years ago, a National System of Municipal Training was established by request from the Chilean
Association of Municipalities, which operates it jointly with the Sub-Secretariat of Regional and
Administrative Development of the central government.

Box 2: Four Possible Criteria to Consider for the Minimum Size of Municipalities
Although the desirable minimum size of municipalities is a complex issue that must be addressed in the
historical and political contexts of each country, there are four basic criteria that can be followed as
guideline for policy decisions:
(1) The production/cost efficiency/population criterion. The international experience shows that although
58

See Castañeda (1992) for a discussion of these issues. Adequate salaries and employee turnover are still
major problems for local governments in many countries in Latin America. For example, in the Dominican
Republic, 75% of local government employees earn less than 3,000 Dominican pesos ($??), a salary which
places them in the bottom quintile of the country‘s earnings distribution.
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unit costs for some public services are not much affected by the scale or size of the local government, in
the case of other services (such as water, brown fields or public transportation) unit costs can be much
affected by scale. Thus, given the existence of economies of scale for some specific services, depending
on the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, in order to arrive at the lowest cost of production it is
required to reach a minimum size in terms of population. Depending on the type of services, the minimum
population size can range between 10 thousand and 100 thousand. Yet we must note that there are other
ways to provide services in a cost efficient manner than by imposing a minimum absolute size on all local
governments, including buying the services from a larger local government, creating an association
between several smaller local governments and join forces to produce the service, or even buying the
services from a large privatized producer. What this means is that this criterion of a minimum population
size should be administered intelligently with flexibility to allow for these other service delivery
possibilities.
(2) The representation/political responsiveness/accountability criterion. The general presumption is that
smaller local governments will generally tend to be more representative and accountable to the residing
population. But consideration must also be given to ethnic diversity or fractionalization of the population
and adequate representation of the interest of minority groups. Consideration may also be given to
population density. From an accountability and representation focus it would seem that a simple but useful
rule of thumb will be the time required to travel to the location of the municipality building.
(3) The financial/fiscal capacity criterion. It does seem reasonable to require that any new local
government have a minimum level of economic capacity to self finance some of its service needs. How to
measure this capacity is not always an easy matter, but it should involve some approximation to the
―expenditure needs‖ and the ―fiscal capacity‖ of each potential municipality and the setting of some
threshold for the difference between needs and capacity.
(4) The administrative capacity criterion. This can be measured in a number of different ways, but
fundamentally what is required is that there be qualified personnel available for running efficiently the
business of the local government.

II.b Issues on Intergovernmental Fiscal System Design
Lack of clarity in the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to local governments
One of the weakest points of many decentralization programs in Latin America
has been the scant attention given to a clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities of
sub-national governments, thus ignoring this crucial first step in the design of any system
of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Instead, the focus often has been almost exclusively
on putting in place some form of financing scheme.59 At present, there continues to be
too much emphasis in many countries of the region on decentralization processes simply
understood ―as the provision of some of revenue sharing and transfers‖ to local
governments, ignoring the fundamental rule that ―finance should follow function.‖ To be
sure, in most countries in the region it is possible to extract from different pieces of
legislation (including the constitution, municipal codes) an explicit statement or an
59

See Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) for a discussion of the proper sequencing of decentralization
reforms.
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approximation of what expenditure assignments may be, but this is generally misleading
in that in those assignments there is still a high level of imprecision regarding what local
governments are responsible for vis-à-vis central agencies (or provincial- state agencies)
and regarding national transfers and grants. On closer analysis, the assignment of
functional responsibilities remains in many cases too general and vague. For example in
El Salvador, the municipal code gives authority to municipalities to perform a list of
duties or responsibilities that clearly overlaps with those also assigned to central
government; the same is true in Uruguay. In other cases, the vagueness and confusion lie
in the way that legislation is implemented (or not implemented). For example, Law 66 of
1997 in the Dominican Republic added primary and secondary education to the
responsibilities of local governments; yet real power and decision-making remain with
the regional Education and Culture committees, which may be considered a
deconcentrated tier of the central government.60
Beyond the operational inefficiencies associated with the unclear assignments of
functions, an important consequence of unclear responsibilities are the ambiguities in
political accountability this situation introduces—how do people know which level of
government to hold accountable for what? The governance implications and what this
means for attaining the purported benefits of decentralization are quite considerable.
Another problem is that the assignment of expenditure responsibilities in
practically all Latin American countries is uniform for all local governments, regardless
of their size and administrative capacity. As we saw above, a good way to address these
shortcomings is the creation of associations of local governments into mancomunidades.
Alternatively, there may be room for asymmetric assignments for municipalities of
different size and administrative capacity
Nevertheless, highly asymmetric assignment of expenditure responsibilities can
itself lead to confusion. For example, in Ecuador, the Constitution (Article 226)
establishes the obligation of central government to transfer functional competencies at the
60

Although the trend in the region has been toward more devolution of responsibilities to local
governments, there are exceptions. For example, Jamaica has been recentralizing functions previously
assigned to the local governments (Parish Councils) through the creation of national entities under the
tutelage of the Ministry of Local Government, which is in charge of fire protection services, parks and
markets.
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discretion (by voluntary request) of sub-national governments. This means that any subnational government can request a full or partial competence in a particular area at their
discretion, leading to great heterogeneity in central-local relations, thereby compromising
the overall effectiveness of intergovernmental coordination. A better practice could be to
design two or at most three different packages of expenditure responsibilities that can be
devolved to local governments depending on their administrative capacity. However, an
important issue with asymmetric approaches is the need for using verifiable criteria—
that is, differential assignments must be grounded in something other than political
connections.
Another factor contributing to confusion in the assignment of expenditure
responsibilities is the common practice of unfunded mandates. Frequently, line ministries
may partially decentralize certain competencies to local governments without providing
the required resources to implement them properly. There may also be increasing
reporting requirements on local governments without adequate coordination among
central government agencies or the provision of the technical and financial means to
make that reporting possible.
A workable system of expenditure assignments, no matter how specific, is
developed in the laws and regulations, always requires institutions of coordination and
effective dialog between the different levels of governments. Because of the larger
number of municipalities, it is important that the voice and interests of these local
governments be represented by associations of municipalities. On this front there has
been considerable progress since practically all countries in the regions have developed
effective municipal associations that have taken on the representation of municipal
interests.61 However, central authorities have not always recognized and accepted these
associations as strategic partners in improving policy design in expenditure assignments
and in strengthening all other components of fiscal decentralization systems.
One final issue in the practice of expenditure assignments is the practically
universal lack of effective and transparent methodologies to translate the assignment of
functional responsibilities into expenditure needs. Sometimes, historical costs (or levels
of expenditures prior to decentralization) are used as a guide. Different methodologies
61

See, for example, the discussion in Porto (2009).
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are used in other countries around the world that could be successfully implemented in
the region. The advantage of having some effective method to calculate expenditure
needs is that the discussions on, and ultimate design of, revenue assignments, whether
through own revenue or fiscal transfers, becomes more informed and rational.

Insufficient revenue autonomy
The level of tax revenue autonomy of local governments differs quite
significantly across Latin American countries. Countries such as Brazil and Chile have
relatively high autonomy and countries such as El Salvador, Mexico and Peru have
significantly less autonomy. But, in general, as in some other regions of the world
(Africa, Asia and many European countries), local revenue autonomy in Latin America
remains below what is desirable. There is a debate in the fiscal decentralization literature
as to what the ―desirable‖ level of local revenue autonomy would be. According to one
view, all that is needed is that local governments have revenue autonomy ―at the margin.‖
This means that they should have to either raise or lower their own taxes in order to
expand or contract their budgets, even when the rest of the financing is done through
government transfers and revenue sharing. From this point of view, autonomy at the
margin should thus allow local authorities to adjust their resources while showing
flexibility, accountability and transparency towards residents. According to a second
view, more accountability and especially more fiscally responsible behavior of local
governments within the national public finance system require near to full self-financing
by those local governments that have the fiscal means –i.e., the necessary own tax base
— to do so, while other local governments with lower tax bases also ought to be helped
through equalization grants. This second view also allows for the existence of conditional
central government grants to support the implementation of national development
programs and priorities at the local level. Although newer and less well-known, the
second view offers all the advantages of the first view plus it can add significantly on the
fiscal responsibility and government accountability sides. However, it could be argued
that fuller financing of municipalities with their own taxes may not be possible because
of tax administration issues; for example, collecting some taxes at the central level could
allow economies of scale and information advantages that would not be present if those
27
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taxes were collected locally. But here it is very important to differentiate between the
assignments of certain taxes to local governments (in the sense of which level gets the
revenues and decides on the applicable tax rates) and who actually does the
administration of those taxes. In particular, it is quite possible to assign a certain tax at
the local level and have it administered by the central tax administration authorities.62 For
example, in Chile, the real estate tax is entirely designed for municipal use but it is
collected by a specialized agency of the central government (Servicio de Impuestos
Internos, SII), which manages to keep the levels of tax evasion low.
The lion‘s share of financing for local governments in the region continues to
come from different forms of central government transfers including revenue sharing.
This is a common feature in other regions of the world; transfers have experienced an
increasing trend as they are the most often used form of financing newly devolved
responsibilities to local governments. With this in mind, some important and correct
policies have been adopted in various countries of the region.

For example, many

countries in the Latin American region have taken steps to increase the share of own
taxes in local budgets. Most countries have now assigned the property tax to the local
level. This is a good thing because there are many features of the property tax that make
it an ideal tax for local governments.63 However, the property tax remains highly
underutilized in the region for a variety of reasons.64 As we have seen, several other taxes
have also been assigned to local governments in many countries, including vehicle tax,
betterment levies, and different forms of business taxes and licenses. These are good
measures to be imitated by those countries that still allow too little local tax autonomy.
Another best practice measure to be imitated by all countries in the region is to allow a
62

See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev ( 2005). We must note that there is no guarantee that
the central tax administration will be more efficient and productive in the collection of local taxes; among
several concerns, the central administration may have low incentives to collect local taxes. Recently in
Costa Rica collections from the property tax increased very significantly after the administration and
enforcement of this tax was shifted from the central tax administration to the municipalities.
63
The property tax is highly visible and because of the low geographical mobility of its base and because
property values tend to reflect well in general the quality of local services, the property tax can approximate
well the concept of a benefit tax, where residents pay for the services they receive (see Sepulveda and
Martinez-Vazquez, 2009). All of this is likely to increase political accountability of local officials. The
property tax may also have relatively low efficiency losses compared to other local taxes. In terms of
administration, there can be flexibility in taking advantage of a mixed local and central administration and
enforcement approaches See Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Youngman (2008 and 2010).
64
See Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) for an evaluation of the performance of property taxes in
the region.
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certain degree of discretion to municipalities in setting the rates of their local taxes,
between some maximum and minimum approved levels.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to make a strong case for the policy design of a greater
degree of tax autonomy for local governments when there is at least a perception that
many local governments in the region do not make effective use of the tax autonomy that
is currently granted to them in the law. This is most clear in the case of the property tax
for which actual revenues collected are a small fraction of the revenue potential.65 So the
realization of more revenue autonomy for local governments may need to be
accompanied by a significant improvement in local tax effort. However, it is important to
note that low tax effort (known in the region as ‗pereza fiscal‘) is a complex problem.
First, there is often confusion between low tax effort (‗pereza fiscal‘) and low tax
capacity or economic/fiscal poverty of jurisdictions. Establishing the presence of ‗pereza
fiscal‘ requires a comparison between actual tax collections and potential tax collections
of every particular jurisdictions; this is a difficult and complex task in many cases.
Second, once the presence of ‗pereza fiscal‘ can be established, it is important to
understand its multiple roots, from simple political economy issues (local officials may
simply be happy spending funds but never raising them), to lack of economic resources
(building an updated fiscal cadastre is expensive), to inadequate methodologies for
evaluation, to the lack of skilled human resources, or even to the negative incentives to
local tax effort provided by the central government‘s existing fiscal transfer system.
However, the region offers success stories in raising local tax effort, as provided by the
recent experiences of Bogotá and Lima (see Box 3).

Box 3: A Tale of Two Cities: Bogotá’s Success Story in Raising Local Tax Effort
and Lima’s Success with a New Approach to Tax Administration
Bogotá provides an example of a local government that has had success in raising local tax effort (the
city was awarded a prize by the United Nations in 2002 for being the most improved local government in
the world.) Starting in the late 1980s, The Municipality of Bogotá began a program of civic education
during which it emphasized the importance of paying taxes and the accompanying benefits for citizens
that derive from a stronger local government. It significantly increased property tax collections through a
series of administrative improvements, enforced business taxes, privatized certain government run
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See Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009)
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organizations, and successfully issued its own bonds, including foreign markets, receiving a AAA rating,
66
Particularly noteworthy is that the Municipality of Bogotá in 2006 raised 42 percent of its tax revenues
from the local business tax (Impuesto de Industria y Comercio, ICA). The updating of the fiscal cadastre
in 2009 has also produced significant increases in revenues from the property tax. It is expected that the
assessed tax base for this levy will increase by more than 50 percent by 2010, bringing additional $51
millions in revenues or a 13.3 percent increase over collections before the updating of the cadastre.
Lima introduced in 1996 with some other provincial Peruvian municipalities a semi-autonomous Tax
Administration Service (SAT in Spanish), with the goal of increasing collections for own local taxes.
This followed the model of a national-level SAT. The SAT of Lima is autonomous in its financial and
human resource management and it is financed through a share of the taxes and fees commissions it
collects. The sharing in collections by Peruvian municipalities range from 3% to 10%. But note that the
local authorities are still responsible for regulating and controlling the SATs‘ work. There have been
some clear benefits for those Peruvian municipalities that, like Lima, adopted a SAT approach. For
example, those municipalities that adopted a SAT increased their own revenue by 80.9 %, or 9 % annual
average, between 1998 to 2007; by comparison over the same period the municipalities that did not
adopt a SAT saw their revenues increase by 61.2%, or 6.8% annual average. The empirical studies show
that the trust in tax administration in Lima and other municipalities where a SAT was adopted has
increased. This could be attributed to lower political intervention in administrative processes, higher
client focus management, improved public relations, and a reduction of corrupt practices. But not all
have been kudos for the new local tax administration. The same empirical survey studies identify some
issues associated with the SATs: a limited link between the revenue collection and public services and
the public perception of tax administration as ―insensible.‖ But some of this is to be expected since the
SATs have gone against the conventions and took advantage of not well defined rules, especially in the
SAT of Lima. One of the key characteristics of the SAT agencies has been their innovation drive,
including internal processes, the use of modern technologies, human resource development, improved
financial management, and the collaboration across tax administrations.

A third issue is the need to explore what other taxes with significant revenue
potential could possibly be assigned to local governments in order to increase their
revenue self-sufficiency, such as, for example, a flat-rate piggy back personal income tax
or local surtaxes on some excise duties, such as those on vehicle fuel. Another possibility
may be the wider adoption of other taxes that have been working quite well in some
countries in the Latin American region. An example of that is the more intense use of
betterment levies of taxes, which can complement annual real property taxes. Betterment
levies are being used quite successfully, for example, in Colombia. See Box 4. Another
possibility is the adoption of some form of final retail tax such as in the case of Brazil‘s
ISS (Tax on Services, as discussed in Box 5.) But although this type of tax fits fine within
the Brazilian tax system where the federal and state VAT levies exclude for their bases

66

See Acosta (2004).
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many important services, it may be more problematic in most other country contexts for
overlapping with the existing VATs.67
An alternative to the ISS, that would not present potential conflicts with the
existing national VATs, is the broader base local business tax (Impuesto de Industria y
Comercio, ICA) in Colombia. This is a local ―direct‖ tax on all business activities
(industry, trade and services) that uses as the presumptive base the monetary value of
annual transactions and it is levied at different rates depending on the sector ranging from
0.41 percent for the production of food stuffs to 1.38 percent for the sales of alcoholic
beverages, tobacco products and fuels; financial transactions pay a rate of 1.1 percent.
The ICA is one of the most important sources of municipal tax revenues in Colombia, on
average representing approximately 42 percent of annual tax revenues of municipalities,
but as much as 72 percent in the Municipality of Cali.
Another form of local business tax with revenue potential is Chile‘s ―patente
municipal.‖ This annual levy, which is administered by the municipalities, is paid on any
commercial activity (trade, professional, industrial, and sale of alcoholic beverages) that
requires a permanent office location; municipalities select rates between 0.25 and 0.5
percent that fall on the declared (to the national tax administration) own capital of the
business. The ―patente municipal‖ raises approximately the same amount of municipal
revenues in Chile as the property tax (―impuesto territorial.‖)
In order of importance, in terms of revenue collections in the Latin American
region, the two sets of taxes that are generally of equal importance include, first, the
property taxes (impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles, IBI) and the different taxes on
business activities and services. In a distant third place we find those taxes falling on the
use of motor vehicles. Generally, there would appear to be fiscal space to increase local
revenues for taxes on motor vehicles. This is also the case in many countries in the
regions for local fees and charges where in many cases these can be completely out of
date.68

67

For example, in the recent past Nicaragua eliminated a quite productive local sales tax as part of policy
conditionality from the International Monetary Fund precisely because of the conflict it represented with
the existing national VAT.
68
For example, reportedly in the case of El Salvador municpal fees and charges date from 1954.
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Box 4: Betterment Levies (“Contribución de Valorización”) in Colombia
In general terms, a betterment tax recoups some of the benefits accrued to property owners due to adjacent
public investment that increases the value of that property. (Bird & Slack 2006). Since most real state
property is significantly affected by public facilities surrounding it, this tax has significant revenue
potential. In Colombia, this tax receives the name Contribución de Valorización, with a long history
dating back to colonial times. The constitution gives municipalities and other public entities the right to a
share on the added value produced by investments made in urban settings (e.g. infrastructure works). The
tax is being looked at with interest in other countries and the first Latin American conference of
Valorization was held in Bogota (Colombia) in 2009.69 The levying of the tax implies a series of steps
including, the determination of the costs and benefits of the project, the geographical area that is expected
to benefit and a method to distribute the costs and benefits of the project among the different properties.
This distribution can use an array of ‗benefit factors‘(use of property, closeness, access, etc.) or simply a
land area, linear size of lot front, etc.
Bogotá also levies a tax called Participación en Plusvalia70 defined as the contribution owed by owners of
real estate property as a result of modifications that increase the value of property. This is similar to the
betterment tax except that it captures only changes in urban codes that affect the ways the property can be
used or the intensity of its use (how much can be constructed) that may increase its value.

Box 5: The ISS in Brazil71
The ISS (Imposto sobre Servicos/Tax on Services) is a municipal level tax levied on those services that
are left out of Brazil‘s state value added tax (ICMS). The services that may be taxed under ISS are defined
by federal law, but the states may decide whether to tax or exempt some of those services. The base
covers a wide range of services including, IT services, rental of premises, medical services, veterinary
services, personal services (barber shops, etc), professional services (engineering, architecture, law,
accounting, etc.), education and training, hotels and tourism, parking, leisure entertainment (movies,
shows), repair services, financial services (by banks, etc.), municipal transportation, port, terminal, and
airport services. The tax base is the revenue generated from the provision of services. The rate that
municipalities may charge for ISS is locally set but cannot exceed 5 percent (in the past, it could go as
high as 10 percent). Although the tax rate to be applied is the one charged by the municipality in which
the business resides, there are exceptions in which the tax rate is the one belonging to the municipality
where the service is rendered (e.g. construction). Producers of services are charged with paying and
recordkeeping of the ISS. Buyers of services do not directly see the tax they pay as it is included in the
price charged to them by vendors.
Although the ISS is collected at the municipal level, its importance varies greatly across local
governments; according to the Receita Federal (national tax administration) 1 percent of municipalities
(out of more than 5,500) account for 73 percent of the tax collection. The ISS collected approximately
0.5% of GDP in the mid-to-late 1990s and more recently, tax collections are near 0.8% of GDP. As the
maximum tax rates were lowered sometime in the early 2000s, the observed increase in collections as
share of GDP might come either from an expanded tax base and/or better efforts in collecting the tax.
There is some evidence of the expansion of the tax base; when the rates were lowered in 2003, the ISS
69

I Congreso Latinoamericano de Valorizacion; http://www.lonjadebogota.org.co/Portals/0/Docs/
Information about this tax may be found at:
http://www.shd.gov.co/portal/page/portal/portal_internet/impuestos/impuestos_imp/Plusvalia/INFO%20PL
USVALIA
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See, among others, Deloitte (2010), Government of Brazil (2009), KPMG (2006), Banco Central do
Brasil (2000) and Purohit (1997).
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was also extended to services provided by financial institutions –in particular banking services.
The ISS is not without problems. One issue is the multiplying of the tax in the production of
products/services for future use, since users of services cannot identify the amounts of ISS paid to balance
against the ISS they would receive; remembering that the price for the services are ISS inclusive. Another
issue has been the treatment given to exports. The import of services is subject to this tax, and although it
should not apply to exported services, in fact in serveral circumstances some exports may become subject
to this tax.72 .
With regard to the future of the ISS, there have recently been calls in Brazil for the simplification of the
tax system where–one way or another- the elimination of the ISS was contemplated. This viewpoint
supports the integration of the federal-based IPI and state-based ICMS (both value-added type taxes) and
the locally-based ISS within a general VAT whose revenues could be shared by all three levels of
government. However, the increasing importance of the ISS in municipal budgets, the potential loss in
local autonomy, and the difficulties of coordination at different levels of government weigh-in on the
other side of the argument.

Unbundling revenue sharing
Revenue sharing is the most common mechanism for arranging fiscal transfers to
sub-national governments in Latin America and in many countries provisions for revenue
sharing are enshrined in the constitution. As mentioned in Section 1, fiscal
decentralization to local has often been understood simply as the sharing of central
government revenues without relating the additional revenue to any particular
expenditure assignments to local and regional governments.
One of the most negative aspects of revenue sharing in other parts of the world is
that it can exacerbate the substantial horizontal disparities across local governments when
carried out on a derivation (i.e. origin basis). Fortunately, this has generally been avoided
in Latin American countries.73 An important exception has been the revenue sharing in
natural resources, which in countries such as Peru and Ecuador is fundamentally
implemented on a derivation basis. This has led to significant horizontal disparities
among municipalities.74 In most Latin American countries fiscal transfers from revenue
72

See KPMG (2006).
Note that this does not mean that there are no significant regional disparities in the Latin American
region, it simply means that the more frequent use of the derivation or origin principle would have made
things worse. As discussed above, regional fiscal disparities arise from the differences in economic bases.
And the more tax autonomy is provided the higher the potential for enlarged fiscal disparities and therefore
the higher need for the implementation of equalization grants.
74
In the case of Peru, the evolution of international prices for natural resources has had a significant impact
on the transfers system. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) currently shares 50 percent of
mining and hydrocarbon revenues with local governments. Transfers from central government to regional
73
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sharing are distributed according to a set of parameters or formulas that tries to achieve
several objectives, one of which is some degree of equalization. One of the positive
aspects of revenue sharing is that it manages to combine the unconditional use of funds
with rather plentiful and buoyant sources of revenue.
The main problem with general revenue sharing is that there is some confusion
over what exactly distribution formulas are trying to achieve; pursuing many objectives
with essentially one instrument tends to be the source of that confusion. Also, it is not
always clear that the best way to proceed is to give local governments the unconditional
use of all of these funds.75 The reforms being introduced or contemplated in some Latin
American countries consist fundamentally of the unbundling of the revenue sharing
system into two additional separate transfer mechanisms, namely: (i) an equalization
transfer with unconditional use of funds and financed from a pool extracted from the
shared revenues. This would exclusively pursue the goal of equalization of horizontal
fiscal disparities, and (ii) a system of specific or conditional grants for current
expenditure and investment purposes, financed with also some of the revenue sharing
funds. The use of these funds would be earmarked in pursuit of a variety of sectoral
objectives. Advances in this general direction have been made in countries like Brazil and
Chile, while countries like Ecuador, El Salvador and Honduras are still using an
unbundled revenue sharing scheme as the main funding source of local governments,

The need to rationalize the transfer system
The system of transfers plays a pivotal role in drawing together the other elements
of the intergovernmental fiscal system—making up for the vertical and horizontal gaps

and local governments increased exponentially after 2000 but plummeted in 2009. This experience has
given rise to very significant horizontal imbalances between municipalities because the sharing of mining
revenues is highly concentrated on seven departments, accounting for close to 80% of the total. This has
created problems with increased unspent balances during the boom years because of limited capacity to
identify and execute productive investment projects. It has also continued to expose local governments to
high volatility in revenue streams, as witnessed with the oil price boom of two years ago and the more
recent global recession. This raises the larger issue of the need for diversification of the subnational
revenue pool.
75
The point here is to achieve in the shorter term a more appropriate mix of unconditional and conditional
grants, but without losing sight of the fact that, in the longer term, it is desirable to increase
unconditionality of local governments funding – although obviously not for everything--, as new functions
are undertaken, local performance improves, and so on.
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that own source revenues and revenue sharing cannot meet, not undermining local tax
effort, creating incentives for externality generating spending that local governments
would not fund out of their own sources, not undermining incentives for creditworthy
municipalities to borrow, and so on. This all requires a carefully executed structure of
transfers, using different instruments to pursue different objectives and making sure these
instruments do not work against each other.
With the exception of a few countries, the current system of transfers to local
governments in Latin America lacks a clear orientation. Most countries still have to
introduce unconditional equalization grants that incorporate in some formula-based
measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.76 When some equalization elements
are introduced into the revenue sharing formulas, actual revenue collections are often
used instead of measures of tax capacity, thereby creating problems of negative
incentives for tax effort. The current approaches used to incorporate differences in
expenditure needs in the revenue sharing formulas are also problematic. For example, the
use of population, which is very common, is a good approximation of need for some
services but not so good for others. The number of children of school age provides a
better approximation for basic education needs than population as a whole. The relative
share of infants and the elderly in the population provides a better approximation for
health care needs than the population per se. In some cases, especially in Central
American countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua, the existing formulas positively
discriminate in favor of small municipalities, which in turn create problems of fairness
and economic viability and regional development.
Even though many countries have some form of conditional grants, these lack
structure and predictability, especially in the area of capital grants. When conditional
grants are used, complexity of the system is often a problem.77 This complicates
compliance-administrative costs by local governments, in many cases penalizing smaller
jurisdictions with low administrative capacity, and also dilutes the achievement of central
government goals. A remedy to these problems, following best international practice, has
been to consolidate many of these specific or conditional programs into block grants.
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Some exceptions include Chile‘s revenue equalization grant.
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While the specific conditional grants impose on local governments a narrow use of funds
(e.g. funds to buy furniture for primary schools), block grants are still conditional but
have much broader parameters for the use of funds (e.g., the funds must be spent on
primary education). The advantages of using just a few block grants are simplification
and expansion of choices for local governments, thus aligning the final allocation of
public resources more closely to the priorities of individual local governments (e.g.,
repairing the school building instead of buying new furniture), without unduly
compromising the general goals of central government sectoral policies (e.g., promoting
the quality and standards of primary education in the country.)

Increasing fiscally responsible local borrowing
Historically the Latin American region has suffered some of the worst incidences
of fiscally irresponsible sub-national borrowing in the world. The negative experiences of
Brazil and Argentina, with uncontrolled sub-national borrowing and hyperinflation
during the 1980s and 1990s, are still used as examples of what can go wrong in this area
of sub-national finance. One consequence of those experiences is that the policy of some
countries in the region towards local government borrowing has become excessively
conservative and restrictive.
For example, in Chile, local governments are—in principle—not allowed to
borrow or take out loans of any kind. But outright prohibitions are not necessary or
effective either. In the same country, indirect borrowing through leasing contracts or by
delaying the payment of current expenditure makes that norm difficult to enforce. In
Uruguay, any domestic or foreign debt issue by local government needs to be approved
by the national congress. Peru also provides an example of legislative conservatism in the
matter of local borrowing: The central government has established indebtedness rules to
maintain fiscal prudence by two laws (the Law on Fiscal Prudence and Transparency LPTF- and the Law on Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency – LRTF-) Besides limits
on debt service ratios and total debt the laws also limit the rate of growth of municipal
expenditures to a maximum of 3 percent per year. However, this framework has not been
fully enforced because of insufficient monitoring and the lack of effective sanctions and
many local governments in Peru carry large budgetary arrears. At the other extreme, and
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more like an exception, is the case of Paraguay, where there is practically no limit or
restriction on local borrowing.
Thus a pending challenge for several countries in the region is how to set up
institutions that effectively regulate and monitor borrowing without becoming overly
restrictive of local governments. Many countries are still struggling to introduce a
credible system of penalties for lack of compliance. The development of information and
monitoring systems covering all aspects of borrowing,78 including budgetary arrears with
official institutions and private providers, is urgently needed. But the key ingredient for
fiscally responsible behavior of sub-national units remains the political will of the central
government authorities to implement the existing regulatory frameworks.
A second challenge for practically all countries is how to make more credit
available to local governments for responsible borrowing.79 In practice, the level of
borrowing by local governments in Latin America is far too low to meet the present large
needs for public infrastructure across the sub-continent.80 The exceptions are large cities,
which tend to have ample access to domestic credit markets and in many cases also to
international markets with accompanying international credit ratings. Thus, the capital
cities of La Paz (Bolivia) and Lima (Peru) display a very different picture from that of
most other municipalities.
The absence of real access to borrowing by the average municipality in the region
is a complex issue. It is explained by a multitude of causes, ranging from the lack of tax
autonomy of local governments to the lack of development of national financial markets.
One potential remedy for the scarcity of local credit is the creation of semi-official
financial intermediaries or municipal banks.81 As shown in Table 6, several Latin
78

Monitoring systems for local indebtedness have often proved of doubtful utility. For example, in Ecuador
and Peru information on debt is taken directly from the financial statements of sub-national governments
and is not crosscheck with other sources. In Argentina, the Federal Council for Fiscal Responsibility
created by the Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2004 and in charge of monitoring compliance with norms and
rules of fiscal and financial behavior does not receive timely information from the majority municipalities
as of 2009.
79
Part of the solution can be direct on-lending to municipalities by regional-multinational institutions such
as the Confederation Andina de Fomento (CAF) or the Banco Centroamericano de Inversiones, or
international organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) or the World Bank.
However, a large part of the solution needs to be the mobilization of domestic credit sources.
80
Brazil is an exception.
81
Central governments also guarantee on-lending to local governments from multilateral international
organizations, including the World Bank, the IDB, and CAF.
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American countries have created this type of institution to facilitate long-term credit to
local governments. However, the experience of these institutions has been mixed because
of the difficulty of maintaining them at arms‘ length from central government officials
and of operating them with strict banking criteria. See Box 6.

Box 6: Practice with Municipal Development Banks and Funds in Latin America82
Experience with municipal development banks in Latin America has been mixed, as has been the case in
many other countries around the world. Although quite a few countries have introduced some sort of
specialized financial intermediaries or municipal development funds to raise capital financing for local
governments, fewer of those institutions have been transformed into financial institutions with marketoriented practices and controls channelling private savings to finance public infrastructure. This box
presents a summary of experiences with municipal development banks and funds in the Latin America
region.
Bolivia
The National Urban Development Service (Servicio Nacional de Desarollo Urbano (SENDU)) existed
from 1972 to 1986. It was a semi-autonomous agency of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs,
which provided loans (as well as training courses and technical assistance) to municipalities. This body
was severely criticized for its liberal loan policy, abolished in 1986 under the structural adjustment
program imposed by the IMF, and not replaced.
Brazil
The Integrated Program of State Improvements (PIMES) was established as a municipal development
fund administered by BADESUL, the development bank of the Rio Grande do Sul, which owns and
controls it. The program has two components: 1) institutional and human resource development, and 2)
infrastructure investments. The first component comprises about 10 percent of the total project costs and
includes technical assistance, training and equipment for municipalities, the State Water Company
(CORSAN), other state sector agencies, etc. The second component represents about 90 percent of the
total programs budget and includes the financing of projects in water supply and sanitation, street paving
and lighting, drainage and erosion control, and so on. The Municipal Action Program (PRAM) was
established in 1991 by the Parana state bank BANESTADO, originally serving as the bank‘s financial
agent. PRAM was eventually converted into a revolving State Urban Development Fund (FDU),
administered by BANESTADO with technical assistance provided by a legally autonomous organization
that in practice functions as a department of the State of Parana Secretariat of Planning.
PARANACIDADE was created in 1996 as a non-profit corporate entity to provide institutional and
technical services to municipalities in Parana; this institution also collects and invests financial resources
from the state‘s urban and regional development program, managing the State Urban Development Fund
(FDU), which makes loans to municipalities at maturity ranging from 8 years for urban infrastructure to
10 years for social infrastructure. One of the main explanations for PARANACIDADE‘s success is its
support of capacity building for municipalities.
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See Peterson (1996). There are other relevant initiatives in the region that for space reasons are not
developed in this box, including the Banco del Estado (BEDE) in Ecuador and La Caixa in Brazil. At the
regional level the Confederacion Andina de Fomento (CAF) and the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) have been active supporters of on-lending programs for the development of local public
infrastructure.
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Colombia
Colombia has been successful in using its Municipal Development Funds to accelerate the development of
private credit markets for local government. The Territorial Financing Institution (FINDETER), which
began in 1994 as an infrastructure financing window within the National Mortgage Bank, eventually
evolved into a development bank for municipalities, working through the commercial banking system. In
essence, FINDETER operates as a second-level financing institution which re-discounts commercial bank
loans to municipalities. The banks‘ good credit experience through FINDETER has led them to commit
their own resources to municipal lending. Intermediate-sized cities and departments in Colombia now
borrow primarily through commercial bank loans, while small cities and towns continue to rely on
FINDETER. The largest cities now finance their credit requirements primarily through bonds.
Honduras
The Municipal Bank (BANMA) was established in 1961 as a bank owned by municipalities with the
intent of providing municipalities with financial resources for investment projects and strengthening their
administrative capacity. However, in 2002 the National Congress approved a decree liquidating BANMA
due to the failure of its officials to raise enough capital to meet national standards of operation.
Mexico
The federal public works bank, BANOBRAS, was founded in 1933 as the Banco Nacional Hipotecario
Urbano y de Obras Públicas, S.A (National Urban Mortgage and Public Works Bank), and has long had a
loan program for municipal development. Its operations, however, became complex and bureaucratic and
the allocation of financial resources soon responded more to political than financial criteria. The bank‘s
heavily subsidized loan program used to focus on social housing, water supply systems and the
construction of markets and abattoirs. Since 1988, its interest rates have come close to market rates and
BANOBRAS has switched its focus to improvements of municipal land registers.

II.c Issues on the Budget Process and Transparency
Streamlining the budget process at the local level
Budgets and the budget process at the local level in Latin America have improved
significantly in recent times. A significant innovation has been the introduction of
participatory budgeting (See Box 7). Nevertheless, a variety of issues at different stages
of the budget process still need to be addressed in several countries in the region. In terms
of budget planning and formulation, as we have seen, there are still countries where local
governments must have their budgets, or certain aspects of them, approved on an annual
basis by higher levels of government.
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Ex-ante monitoring and approval of local

budgets by higher level authorities is not needed, where you have local elected councils
and an effective ex-post audit system and the use of the courts to address irregularities.
Local budget autonomy is often also limited in the case of investment projects.84 This
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These countries include: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,.
For example, in Peru all public investment projects must be approved by the National Public Investment
System (SNIP) which is managed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). Through the General
84
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type of approval is not desirable either even though coordination and exchange
information can be very useful.85 This does not mean that smaller rural municipalities
may not benefit from technical assistance in putting together improved budget
documents. Another issue in the preparation stage is the lack of linkages between
planning and budgeting. It is frequent to see many development plans at the local,
regional, and national levels that lack coordination and that do not relate to actual budgets
in terms of the cost of activities for the fulfilment of strategic objectives.
In terms of budget execution, the misappropriation or lack of the proper
appropriation of funds by central government is still a problem in several countries. For
example, in Haiti, 90 percent of local government income supposedly comes from
transfers from the Funds for the Operation and Development for the Territorial
Collectives (FGDCT), administered by the Department of the Interior. This central
government agency claims to distribute those revenues as follows: 50 percent to local
governments,86 40 percent for capital investments and 10 percent remaining within the
Department of the Interior to cover administrative costs. However, recent studies show
that these funds are not being distributed as the Department of the Interior claims, and
that a significant share is retained by the Department to finance its own projects. The
budgets of communes (i.e. the local governments in Haiti) are the most directly hurt,
receiving 33 percent less than what they are budgeted to receive. In nominal terms, local
governments are receiving only $2.50 per person annually, which dramatizes the
significance of the lower revenues that they actually receive. Honduras provides another
example, where the law is not complied with by the central authorities. In particular,
while the Municipal Code establishes that the central government should allocate 5
percent of its tax revenue to the municipalities, in fact only 3 percent appears to have
been allocated in the most recent years.87 Other countries, as the Dominican Republic, are
experimenting similar situations.
Directorate of Multi-Sector Programming (DGPM), MEF has the power to cancel any approval made by
regional and local governments if DGPM consider that SNIP criteria have not been properly applied.
85
The agreements of the local councils can be challenged as in the case of other laws in the constitutional
courts.
86
Of this 50 percent that is designated for local governments, half is supposed to go to the communes, 30
percent to communal section councils, 7 percent to departmental councils and the remaining to other local
government assemblies and councils.
87
See Cardona (2006). http://www.diba.es/innovacio/fitxers/centroamerica.pdf
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There are still deficiencies in some countries in relation to ex-post audit of local
budgets.88 For example, in Paraguay, many municipalities do not comply with the
requirement to send their annual financial reports to the Comptroller General of the
Republic.
Box 7: Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre (Brazil)89
Participatory budgeting has been functioning successfully in the municipality of Porto Alegre, in the state
of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) for the last two decades. The participatory budget of Porto Alegre, called
OPPA, is a process through which ordinary citizens and a team of elected local government officials work
together to define a list of projects to be included within the local government budget. Through this
mechanism for the shared management of budgetary resources, local residents perform the role of
identifying and controlling the implementation of projects. Thus, through the OPPA, local residents are
closely associated with the formulation of public policy at the initial stages, including diagnosis and needs
assessment, the intermediate phase of monitoring and implementation, and the final phase of control and
accountability.
Since its inception the OPPA has contributed to the improvements in the lives of local resident. The
number of participants in Porto Alegre has increased year by year, from approximately 1,000 in 1990 to
nearly 15,000 in 2004. The process has also brought opportunities to better integrate traditionally
marginalized groups of the population in the community‘s development. In 2002, there was a
predominance of women among the leaders of neighbourhood associations, delegates and counsellors. In
addition, most of the OPPA participants belong to lower income groups. Other groups, such as the black
population or, manual and unskilled workers have also seen higher participation rates in the OPPA
process (City, 2003). According to Abers (2000), who studied the profile of OPPA‘s participants, contrary
to some expectations, the process has not given rise to the influence of an elite field of people with more
education or income. In addition, Santos (2003) has shown that OPPA resulted in an increase in the
provision of basic public services. In 1999 the volume of garbage collected and the number of additional
lights installed nearly doubled from the annual average for the period prior to the existence of OPPA
(1985-1988). In 1996, the sewer lines in the municipality were expanded to cover 98% of households
(from a coverage of about 50% in 1989). The World Bank (1999) also attributed to OPPA the paving of
half of the municipality streets and the doubling in the number of students enrolled in primary and
secondary schools.

Addressing the Scarcity of Data on Local Finance
The lack of adequate data on local finance is a widespread problem in the region.
Only a handful of countries currently make municipal data openly available to the
public.90 The lack of municipal budget data has major consequences. First, it makes
policy analysis of the performance of the whole sector and of individual municipalities
88

In El Salvador and other countries in the region, municipalities are required to undergo a full independent
audit once a year to search for signs of corruption and misuse of public funds. This practice does not
eliminate corruption but it goes a long way to keep it under control.
89
See http://www.internationalbudget.org/ for other experiences in participatory budgeting and other
innovations for more open and transparent budgeting practices.
90
See Table A.7 for the list of countries for which municipal budget data is available on a consistent basis.
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much harder and overall less meaningful. Second, it deprives municipalities of the ability
to introduce different forms of ―bench marking‖ competition among themselves, which
could lead to improved efficiency and fiscal performance. The publication of municipal
accounts also provides early signals of fiscal imbalances and other problems, allowing
early intervention to fix these problems. Finally, the lack of easily accessible budget data
reduces the overall level of accountability of local authorities to their citizens. For an
example of best practice in the region see Box 8.

Box 8: Annual Publication of Executed Budgets in Colombia
Law 617 of 2000 in Colombia charges the National Planning Department (DNP) with the annual
publication of the budget results (revenues, expenditures and financial indicators) for all departments and
municipalities, together with an explanation of where there have been problems and where there has been
progress. Included in these records is a detailed recording of the municipalities‘ fiscal performance and
information on all income and expenditures during the past fiscal year. This annual publication is of high
quality. The DNP collects annual data on revenues and expenditures, as well as the debt levels of all local
governments. Each local government reports and certifies the accuracy of its executed budgets to the DNP
through an automated system, the ―Sistema de Información para la Captura de la Ejecución Presupuestal
de Departamentos y Municipios (SICEP). The DNP also receives information on debt levels from the
Controloría General de la República (CGR). These data are regularly used by government institutions and
nongovernmental organizations to monitor the performance of sub-national governments. The
comparisons in performance also allow some form of benchmarking competition among local
governments; which governments are doing relatively better and which are doing worse.

Peru and Ecuador provide other examples of best practice in this area. In Peru, the
Ministry of Economic and Finance manages, among many other data, budget information
of all regions and on an easily accessible website. In Ecuador similar information is made
available by mandate through the Organic Law of 2004 on Transparency and Access to
Public Information (LOTAIP). In terms of the collection and dissemination of budget
information, Brazil is ahead of the two other major federal countries in the region,
Argentina and Mexico. Brazilian municipalities are charged with reporting their budgets
in a standard specific format to the Ministry of Finance every year and this data is then
published with only a twelve month year delay.
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II.d Short-Term and Long-Term Structural Challenges
Municipal governments in Latin America face both short-term challenges, the
most serious being the after-effects of the ongoing global financial crisis, as well as many
long-term structural challenges.

Short term: Addressing the impact of the global crisis
One of the important consequences of the on-going global financial crisis has
been the serious deterioration of the fiscal position of governments around the world. The
ability to weather this type of crisis in the past has been different for central governments
and sub-national governments due to the fact that the latter are often extremely
constrained in running budget deficits and borrowing. The situation is aggravated by the
fact that many local governments in the Latin America region are quite dependent on
central governments transfers and due to this their fiscal autonomy is more limited.
If budgets are reduced due to revenue shortfalls, local governments will be less
able to meet their service delivery responsibilities; there is also the danger that central
governments may use the crisis to justify slowing down ongoing decentralization
programs. At the same time, some countries have recognized the need to keep resources
flowing to local governments during the crisis and therefore local governments may play
an important role in shaping counter-cyclical policy.
In the following paragraphs we use information about the impact of the financial
crisis extracted from responses to a survey sent out by United Cities and Local
Governments (UCLG) to its constituent member associations of local governments in
Latin America and around the world during the third quarter of 2009.
The most significant direct impact of the crisis has been on the level and
composition of local government finances on both the revenue and expenditure sides of
the budget. Although it is generally reasonable to expect decreases in revenues and
expenditures in local government budgets, there is little reason to expect that they will be
in the same proportion across all items.
As in many other countries around the world, many municipal governments in
Latin America have experienced reductions in own revenues. Significantly,
municipalities in several Latin American countries have also experienced reductions in
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the yields of specific tax shares. In particular, significant reductions in revenue sharing
from natural resources are reported by Bolivia (20 %) and Peru (30 %). There have also
been reductions in transfers from central governments. Mexico reports a 20% reduction
in municipal transfers, and Nicaraguan municipalities report transfer losses of $12.5
million.
As in previous financial crises, capital expenditures may be cut more drastically
than current expenditures because they are more easily interrupted or postponed. The
responses to the UCLG survey confirm these expectations for some Latin American
countries. Reductions in capital spending are reported in Mexico and Nicaragua. Some
countries, however, report no decreases or even increases in local capital expenditures, in
part due to the local participation in national counter-cyclical economic stimulus
programs. Increases in municipal capital expenditures are expected in Brazil and
Colombia. In addition, reductions in recurrent spending are expected in Mexico,
Nicaragua, and Peru. But, as in the case of capital expenditures, several countries report
increases in recurrent expenditures as part of central government stimulus packages; for
example, Chile and Colombia.
These results are a consequence of the crisis but also of the policies that have
been implemented to cope with the crisis. Thus, for example, Colombia reports increases
in expenditures despite (in fact, as a means to offset) the crisis. Another potential
response of local governments to deteriorating revenue collections and unchanged or
increased needs for expenditures is to introduce new taxes and fees or to increase the
rates on existing ones. However, no country in Latin America indicates that such action
has been taken. There are no reports either of increased borrowing by municipal
governments in Latin American countries.
Beyond the impacts of the crisis and measures implemented by local governments
in response to it, some local governments in the region are taking advantage of the crisis
to take a harder look at their systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations. For example,
local governments in Ecuador are seeking a timelier and more frequent payment of
transfers by the central government, while those in Bolivia are seeking the promotion of
local economic development policies. Similarly, local governments in Mexico are
seeking the deregulation of local government investment funds and those in Chile and
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Colombia are seeking greater flexibility in the legal framework so that local governments
can develop anti-cyclical policies. Municipalities in several Latin American countries
(Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Peru) point out in the survey to the
potential role played by international organizations through foreign aid for the provision
of increased funds and better coordination in the allocation of those funds to improve
local investments and capacity building.
In summary, municipal governments in Latin America, like their counterparts in
other regions of the world, are going through a financial and economic crisis of
unprecedented depth. The crisis has affected practically all central governments in the
region and it has also affected most local governments in some way. However, as
indicated by the responses to the UCLG survey, there is a great variety in how local
governments across and within different countries have fared. While some local
governments have seen their funding cut and all types of expenditures reduced, others
have actually experienced increases in funding and have increased certain types of
expenditures.

Long term: Structural challenges:
Beyond the short-term issue of regaining fiscal balance, many local governments
across the region face similar long-term structural challenges. Here we highlight three of
these challenges.

1. Strengthening tax capacity and its effective use by local governments. This will
require looking into the entire array of local taxes including some more recent
innovations, such as betterment levies and Brazil‘s ISS (local service tax). But it
would also mean making more effective use of the impuesto predial (local
property tax). The more effective use of property tax will require the periodic
updating of fiscal cadastres with the reassessment of property values and putting
more emphasis on collection efficiency through reductions in compliance costs
and consistent use of penalties.91 However, there will continue to be limitations in

91

See Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) for an analysis of the relative potential of property taxes in
the Latin American region.
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the overall level of tax capacity for many municipal governments, so there will be
a need to continue to provide significant attention to the systems of
intergovernmental transfers, comprising equalization transfers with unconditional
use of funds and conditional block grants.
2. Increasing the efficiency of public expenditures and the quality of public services,
which will mean, among other things, containing budgetary amounts assigned to
salary costs –and not the level of salaries themselves- and getting rid of the biased
belief among central government officials that capital spending is always more
desirable (efficient) than current spending, including non-wage and salary items.92
3. Finding avenues to finance the large capital infrastructure deficit for municipal
services in the region, which will require a combination of capital transfers from
central governments, improving creditworthiness where feasible, and facilitating
prudent borrowing by local governments through the deepening of the
development of private credit markets in the region.

III. Policy Recommendations
The analysis in the above sections has shown that the Latin America region
contains a rich variety of experiences and many lessons, good and bad, about
decentralization and municipal finance. This rich variety of experiences and challenges,
sometimes quite unique,93 has made it difficult to draw up a cross-country analysis.
Nevertheless, there are many common themes and challenges facing municipal
governments in Latin America and different countries have been able to address them
with varying degrees of success. For example, in Chile, the central government has made
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Several countries in the region have introduced general regulations on salary levels in their legislation.
For example, in Brazil the share of wages and salaries in local budgets cannot exceed 65 percent of the
municipal budget. In Chile no municipality may spend more than 35 percent of its own revenues on wages
and salaries. Many other countries impose restrictions as to how different kinds of funds can be spent,
typically requiring spending on capital infrastructure a certain share of their budgets. These measures can
be seen as paternalistic and they reflect existing serious doubts about the efficacy of horizontal
accountability mechanisms at the local level to ensure that local officials make the best choices for their
citizens.
93
For example, the challenges faced by some municipalities in Colombia go beyond fiscal issues. Here,
municipalities in the war-torn areas must face the challenge of being on the frontlines against armed actors
such as drug traffickers, paramilitaries and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
many of these municipalities are encouraged to "share" their resources with these armed groups (Rubio,
2002).
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use of municipal governments to increase the effectiveness of social policies and has
been able to encourage innovation and competition among them. In Colombia, central
legislation can provide administrative flexibility, with local governments exercising
control over staff hiring and salary decisions and at the same provide effective
accountability mechanisms to maintain fiscally responsible decisions by local officials. In
Honduras, a municipal association can successfully provide technical assistance and
training to its members. Changes in the attitudes of municipal officials toward broader
community participation in budget decisions have taken place in countries such as
Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru.
In this concluding section we offer some policy recommendations grouped
according to the set of issues examined in the previous section. Nevertheless, there
remain challenges to be addressed and it will be necessary to continue looking for new
orientations in future research about public local finances in the region.
III.a Recommendations on Organizational Structure:
Countries with problems of fragmentation and small municipalities, should
introduce legislation and practical support for the creation of associations of
municipalities into mancomunidades for the delivery of certain public services requiring
a certain minimum scale. Other solutions to the problem of insufficient scale that could
be pursued include cooperative services agreements between larger and smaller
municipalities, and the contracting of services with private enterprises for the delivery of
services. In addition, careful critical study and consideration should be given to the
creation of new tiers of vertical government (for example, regional governments) as a
solution to some of the weaknesses observed at the existing local governments. A cheaper
more efficient solution can be strengthening through technical assistance and additional
funding of existing governments.
In any case, existing potential incentives to further fragmentation should be
removed. In particular, those countries with transfer formulas that ensure the same
amount of funds to all municipalities independently of their size should discontinue this
practice. Where they do not exist now, new legislation with minimum population and
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fiscal viability requirements should be introduced to prevent any further undesirable
fragmentation of local governments.
Most central governments in the region, and provincial or state governments in the case
of federal systems, should devote more time and resources to developing administrative
capacity, especially in the case of small and rural local governments. Some of this
assistance can be provided for example by working together with and offering support to
municipal associations in order to give more and better technical assistance and training
to local officials in the most cost-effective manner or by tutoring local governments
through contracting with regional universities and colleges.
III.b Recommendations on intergovernmental fiscal system design:
Without clear assignments of expenditure responsibilities to local governments it
is not possible to have an informed judgment on whether or not the level of financing of
these governments is adequate. Most systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the
region would benefit from an explicit clarification of the competencies assigned to local
governments. First, this will require the clear identification of the exclusive
responsibilities of local governments. Second, in the case of concurrent or shared
responsibilities between the local and central (or intermediate level) governments, it will
be necessary to identify which attributes of the particular competence (regulation,
financing, and implementation) are the responsibility of the local governments and which
are that of higher levels of

government. Having a clearer and more transparent

assignment may mean that the assignment would have to identify responsibilities for subfunctions concerning regulation, financing and implementation. There will be no clear
assignments of responsibilities, especially in the case of concurrent functions, until it is
transparent which level of government is exclusively responsible for the different subfunctions involved. Of course, the implementation of services may be done directly by
the local jurisdiction or this unit can make arrangements for its provision, for example by
a private company or some other jurisdiction.
If there are significant differences in administrative capacity among local
governments it may be desirable to introduce temporarily two or at most three different
packages of expenditure responsibilities that can be devolved to local governments
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depending on their administrative capacities and over time, as capacity is acquired,
graduate municipalities to the more complete levels of responsibility.
It is also desirable to adopt transparent approaches to translate the assignment of
local functional responsibilities into expenditure needs in order to have a clear idea of the
financing requirements of local governments.
Greater local revenue autonomy is a challenge not yet being adequately addressed
by most countries in the region. However, there is a need to find a better balance between
the decentralization of expenditure responsibilities and the authority to collect local taxes
from the residents directly benefiting from local services. This will lead to more fiscally
responsible and politically accountable forms of decentralization. Several options are
open going forward with this agenda.
 First, in countries that have not assigned property tax to local governments should
do so. Property tax has several characteristics that make it ideal as a local tax.
 Second, other taxes that should be assigned to local governments are, for
example, vehicle taxes, business licenses, and betterment levies on real estate for
financing basic infrastructure improvements.
 Third, for countries that have not done so, some degree of discretion in setting tax
rates should be granted to all local governments so that they can adjust their tax
bases, within legislated maximum and minimum rates. Other forms of autonomy
beyond rate setting (e.g., adjustments to the tax base or the freedom to introduce
new taxes) are not generally desirable.
 Fourth, coordinated efforts of local and central governments should be made to
increase the revenue yield of property tax and other taxes assigned to local
governments. In the case of property taxes, these should include: regularly
updated and improved property cadastres and property value assessment
methodologies, increased effectiveness in the collection of tax bills, and removal
of disincentives for increases in tax effort by local governments (such as ,
reductions in transfers when more local revenues are collected).
 Fifth, the introduction of new taxes assigned to the local level should be
considered, including wider use of betterment levies and local business taxation,
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such as the ICA (impuesto de industria y comercio) in Colombia or Chile‘s
patente municipal.

Going further in the direction of increasing local tax autonomy would be the
introduction of a local piggy-back personal income tax with a flat rate collected at the
same time as the national income tax is collected. This latter form of local tax is common,
for example, in northern and central Europe, but it has not been tried yet in the Latin
America region. Finally, there is a possibility of considering the introduction of
environmental or ‗green‘ taxes enabled by national legislation on the regulation of the
environment. This form or taxation has not taken root in many Latin American countries
though it provides several important advantages. The first is the so-called ―double
dividend‖ since these taxes not only collect needed revenues but also contribute to a
cleaner environment. These taxes can also fit well in regional and local contexts.
Potential levies in this area would include taxes on the emission of solid waste and water
contamination.
In those countries where revenue sharing is a major source of local finance, it
would be desirable to un-bundle part of the revenue sharing system into separate
transfers, including: (i) an equalization transfer with unconditional use of funds and (ii) a
system of block conditional grants for current and capital purposes. An explicit
unconditional equalization grant is needed to address the important and increasing
problem of regional fiscal disparities in many countries in the region—based on
differences in tax capacity or economic base and differences in expenditure needs due to
geography or the structure of population. Explicit conditional grants are necessary to
ensure national standards and objectives in the provision of important services that have
been decentralized, such as education and health. However, despite the introduction of
those transfers, revenue sharing is likely to remain an important source of general funding
for local governments and a way to address vertical imbalances, especially where it is
more difficult to devolve higher taxing powers to local governments.
In those countries where local borrowing is not allowed, new legislation should
introduce the possibility of responsible local borrowing. In those countries that already
allow municipal borrowing, it would be desirable in many cases to review the current
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status of regulations, streamlining them when necessary so that they are not overly
restrictive. This review should also be focused on the monitoring capabilities of the
central government (including ―floating debt‖ or budgetary arrears with official
institutions and private suppliers, and guarantees through municipal enterprises) and the
introduction of a credible system of penalties for lack of compliance.
Beyond the regulation and monitoring of local borrowing, an even more important
challenge for most countries in the region is to facilitate a significant increase in credit
availability to local governments for responsible borrowing, especially for smaller
municipalities. The solution may sometimes be the creation of official financial
intermediaries or municipal banks. A large amount of information is available within
Latin America and other regions of the world regarding the positive features of these
institutions that should be replicated (e.g., operating with strict banking criteria) and
those features that should be avoided (e.g., operating with less than arms‘ length distance
from political authorities). Policies to encourage the development of private markets for
local credit are equally, or even more, desirable. But it must be recognized that local
credit from private sources is unlikely to develop without more revenue autonomy and
greater transparency of local budgets.
III.c Recommendations on budget process and transparency:
Those countries still requiring ex-ante approval of municipal budgets by higherlevel authorities should phase out this practice and increasingly rely on local
accountability and effectiveness of ex-post audits and the rule of law in order to keep an
eye on the probity of local budget execution. The misappropriation or lack of proper
appropriation of funds in a selected number of countries is a practice that needs to be
stopped and full compliance with ex-post audit rules should be ensured. The ultimate
effectiveness of local public expenditures will depend on the adoption of modern budget
evaluation practices, which remains a pending assignment for most countries in the
region.
The low reliability on municipal finances remains an important problem in the
Latin American region, affecting the quality of policy design and of analytical work. Best
practice in budget transparency and data dissemination in countries such as Colombia and
51
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Peru, for example, should be replicated by all countries in the region where publicly
available data on annual budgets and other aspects of the local finances are still missing.
An effective way to encourage and sustain good practices in budget reporting and data
generation is to put those data to good use by, for example, providing information to
experts and ordinary citizens on performance and by publicizing the results in order to
create benchmark competition across jurisdictions.
There has been continued progress over the past decade with the institutions that
manage finances and with the practice itself of municipal finance in the Latin American
region. Nevertheless, there is a long road ahead of us for further improving the overall
efficiency, equity and accountability of municipal finances in the region.
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Annex 1: Assignments of expenditures functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local)
Colombia
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C

C

C

C

C
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C
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C

C

C

C

C

L

C
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C

C

C

C

C

C
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L

C

Pre-school education
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L

C

L

C

C

C

L

L

Primary education

R
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L

C

L

C

C

C

L

L

Secondary education

R

C/L

R

C

L

C

C

C

L
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Vocational and
technical

R

C/L

R

C

L

C

C

C

L
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Higher education

C
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C
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C

C

C

C

C
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Adult education

R
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C

C

C

C

C

L

Health protection

R
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L

C

C

C

L

NA

Primary care

R
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L

C

C

C

L
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C/L

R

C

C

C

NA
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C/L

L

L

C

C

NA

C
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NA

Functions

Argentina

Bolivia

No

Yes

Yes

Security, police

C/R

C

Fire protection

C/R

Civil protection

Constitution defines
assignments

Brazil Chile

Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala

General
administration

Justice
Civil status register

Education

Public Health

Social Welfare
Kindergarten and
nursery
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Annex 1: Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued)
Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominican
Republic

L

C

C
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C

L
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NA
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C
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C

L
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C
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C/L
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C/L
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C

L

L
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L
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L

L

C

L

L
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R
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C/L

R
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L

L
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L

L
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C

L

L
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L

L

L

L

L

L

L
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L

L

L

L

L
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L

L

L

L

L
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L
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C/L
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L
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L

L

L
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C

C

L

NA

C

C
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NA

L
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C/R/L

R/L
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L

L

C
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L

L
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L

C

C
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L

L
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NA
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C/R/L

L

L

C\L

L

NA

L
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Functions

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil Chile

Family welfare
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C/R

C/L
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Annex 1: Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued)
Costa Rica
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C

C
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L
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C

C
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C

C
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C

C

C
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C

C
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R

C

C
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C

C
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R
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C

L

L

L

Functions
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L
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C/R
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C

C

L

L
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C
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L

L
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C/R
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NA
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C

C

L

L
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C

C
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L
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NA

L

C
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C

C
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Annex 1: Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued)
Functions
Constitution defines
assignments

Honduras
YES

Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua
No
No
Yes

Panama

Paraguay

Peru
YES

Uruguay
Yes

Venezuela
Yes

General
administration
Security, police

L

C

C/R/L

c
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C

C/R/L
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L

L

L
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L

C
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L
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L

C
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C

L
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L

C
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C

C

C
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L

C

C

C

C

C
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L
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C/R/L
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C/L

L

C/R/L

C/R

C/L

C/R/L
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C

L

C/R/L

C/R

C

C/R/L
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C

C

C/R

C/R
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C

C

C/R

C/R
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C

C

R

C/R

Health protection

C/L

L

C/R

C/R

C/L

C/R/L

Primary care

C/L

L

C/R/L

C/R

C

L
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C/L

C/L

C/R

C/R

C

C/R
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L

Education

C/R/L
C

C
C

Public Health
C/L
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Annex 1 Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued)
Functions

Honduras

Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Uruguay

Venezuela

C

C/R/L

Social Welfare
Kindergarten and
nursery

NA

C

C/R

Family welfare services

NA

C/L

C

C/L

C

C/R/L

Welfare homes

NA

C

C/R

L

C

C/R/L

Social security

NA

C

C

C

C

Housing

L

C

L

L

C

L

C

Town planning

L

C/L

L

L

L

L

L

Regional/spatial
planning

L

C/L

R

R

L

R/L

Water & sewage

L

C/L

R/L

L

C/R/L

L

L

Refuse collection &
disposal

L

C/L

L

L

L

L

C/L

Cemeteries &
crematoria

L

na

L

L

L

L

L

Slaughterhouses

L

na

L

L

L

L

L

Environmental
protection

L

C

C/R/L

L

C/R/L

L

C/L

Consumer protection

L

C

C/R/L

C

Theatres & concerts

L

na

R/L

C/L

L

C/R/L

Museums & libraries

L

na

R/L

L

C/L

L

C/R/L

Parks & open spaces

L

C/L

L

L

L

L

R/L

Housing and town
planning

Environment,
sanitation

C

Culture, leisure &
sports
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Annex 1: Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued)
Functions
Sports & leisure

Honduras
L

Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua
C/L
C/R/L
L

Panama

Paraguay

Peru
L

Uruguay
C/L

Venezuela
C/R/L

Religious facilities

L

na

C

L

L

Other cultural facilities

L

C/L

C/R/L

L

L

L

Roads

L

C/L

L

C/L

C/R/L

L

C/R/L

Transport

L

C/L

C/R

C/L

C/R/L

L

C/R/L

Urban road transport

L

C/L

R/L

C/L

L

L

L

Urban rail transport

C

C/L

L

Ports

C

C

C

Airports

C

C

C

Gas

L

C

District heating

L

C

Electricity

L

C

L

L

C/R/L

C/L

C/L

Water supply

L

C

L

L

C/R/L

L

C/L

Agriculture, forests,
fishing

L

C

C

C/R

L

C

Economic promotion

L

C

C/R/L

C/R

L

C/R/L

Trade & industry

L

C

C/R

C/R

L

C/R/L

Tourism

L

C

C/R

C/R

L

L

Other economic services

L

C

C/R/L

C/R/L

Employment

L

C

C/R/L

C

Traffic, transport

L
L

R

C/R

C

C/R

Utilities
C

L

C/L

L

Economic

L
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Annex 1: Revenues and Expenditures by Government Level (in millions of dollars)
Revenues

Expenditures (% total)
Federal
/
central Regional Local

Regional

56,207

11,050

26,190

15,093

3,107

55%

38%

7%

59%

34%

7%

4,298

743

957

3,962

660

880

72%

12%

16%

72%

12%

16%

Brazil(2007)

347,330

187,482

113,905

314,445

174,513

112,332

54%

29%

18%

52%

29%

19%

Chile(2007)

23,533

na

2,307

22,876

na

3,119

91%

9%

88%

Colombia(2006)
Dominican
Republic(2006)

57,134

20,208

32,432

5,809

10,165

64%

22%

67%

na

na

na

na

na

na

Ecuador(2007)
El
Salvador(2007)

8,177

na

1,133

7,934

na

2,423

88%

12%

77%

23%

2,973

na

na

3,602

na

108

100%

97%

3%

Guatemala(2002)

4,621

na

na

5,174

na

na

100%

100%

Haiti(2004)

1,050

na

na

802

na

na

100%

100%

37,145

n.a

3,096

1,788

na

195

92%

na

na

1,233

4,188

na

73

100%

20,484

226,301

81,993

19,678

69%

na

na

na

Bolivia(2008)

Honduras(2004)
Jamaica(2008)
Mexico(2007)
Nicaragua(2002)

81,428

Revenues (% total)
Federal
/
central Regional Local

Local

Argentina(2006)

Regional

Expenditures
Federal
/
central

Country (Most
recent year)

Federal
/
central

248,578

12,567

89,412

n.a

n.a

n.a

Local

14%

8%
25%

12%
12%

21%

90%

10%

98%

2%

6%

69%

25%

6%

3,107

na

59.74

6,718

na

137

98%

2%

98%

2%

Paraguay(2006)

10,943

na

898

4,868

na

423

92%

8%

92%

8%

Peru(2007)
Trinidad and
Tobago(1995)

13,984

3,313

3,703

11,087

3,043

2,774

67%

18%

66%

n.a

n.a

na

8,600

na

na

Uruguay(2007)

n.a

na

na

8,611

na

na

65,736

na

58,515

na

373

Panama(2005)

Venezuela(2007)

177

59

16%

18%

16%

100%
100%

99%

1%

60

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

Table Annexe.2: Origin of Revenues of Local Governments (millions US$)

Country (Most recent year)

Own taxes
and Fees

Shared
revenues

5,502.90

4,685.20

165024

478203

Brazil(2007)

22,746.19

87,345.70

Chile(2007)

1,453.41

na

Colombia(2006)

8,325.70

na

Argentina(2006)
Bolivia(2008)

Dominican Republic(2006)

na

na

Ecuador(2007)

392.02
na

na

na

na

El Salvador (2007)
Guatemala(2002)

Conditional
Transfers

Unconditional
transfers/Aid

na

Own
taxes and
fees (%
of the
total)

Shared
revenues
(% of the
total)

Conditional
Transfers
(% of the
total)

(% of the total)

Own
taxes
and
fees
(% of
GDP)

Shared
revenues
(% of
GDP)

Conditional
Transfers
(% of GDP)

Unconditional
transfers/Aid

Unconditional
transfers/Aid
(% of GDP)

861.9

49.80%

42.40%

0.00%

7.80%

1.22%

1.04%

0.00%

0.19%

4,571.00

11.40%

17.20%

0.00%

71.40%

2.65%

4.01%

0.00%

16.63%

na

3,856.38

20.10%

76.50%

0.00%

3.40%

1.75%

6.67%

0.00%

0.29%

na

853.59

63.00%

0.00%

0.00%

37.00%

0.66%

0.00%

0.00%

0.39%

268625

11882.304

41.20%

0.00%

58.80%

0.00%

2.11%

0.00%

3.02%

0.00%

na

58.40%

10.40%

31.20%

0.00%

0.69%

0.12%

0.37%

0.00%

740.982
na

34.60%

0.00%

0.00%

65.40%

1.62%

0.00%

0.00%

3.07%

Na

69.90%

0.00%

0.00%

30.10%

0.00%

2.07%

0.00%

3.51%

Na

na

25.00%

5.00%

60.00%

10.00%

0.53%

0.11%

1.28%

0.21%

na
0.00

0

Honduras(2004)

1,798.78

340.56

185.76

770.904

58.10%

11.00%

6.00%

24.90%

0.95%

0.18%

0.10%

0.41%

Jamaica(2008)

1,233.00

0.00

0

0

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.16%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Mexico(2007)

3,195.50
na

9,279.25
na

0

8009.244
na

15.60%

45.30%

0.00%

39.10%

2.38%

6.91%

0.00%

5.98%

44.00%

5.00%

11.00%

40.00%

0.56%

0.06%

0.14%

0.51%

29.27

27.54

2.92726

0

49.00%

46.10%

4.90%

0.00%

0.33%

0.31%

0.03%

0.00%

Nicaragua(2002)
Panama(2005)
Paraguay(2006)
Peru(2007)
Venezuela(2007)

Na

306.22

16.16

96.984

478.634

34.10%

1.80%

10.80%

53.30%

1.23%

0.07%

0.39%

1.91%

1,599.70

1,788.55

0

314.755

43.20%

48.30%

0.00%

8.50%

2.62%

2.92%

0.00%

0.52%

167.97

0.00

9.027

0

94.90%

0.00%

5.10%

0.00%

0.07%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%
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